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RENEWING ELECTRICITY COMPETITION
DAVID SCHRAUB*
ABSTRACT
The scholarly literature on law and social movement has historically focused on public
law issues like environmentalism, reproductive rights, and race relations, while staying far
away from business and firm behavior. Business behavior was easily understood as that of
self-interested profit-maximizers and thereby left to the economics. Recently, however, social
movement theorists have begun paying more attention to the business world. While traditional economic models can explain why businesses pursue higher profits, greater market
shares, and superior regulatory climates, they are limited in their ability to explain how
wish becomes reality. The formation and identification of market opportunities are products
of social forces, and firms are part of that process—both shaping and being shaped by social
dynamics which create and recreate the economic terrain.
This Article joins that burgeoning literature by applying a social movements approach
to the energy law field. Specifically, it looks to how voluntary Renewable Energy Credit
(REC) sales—selling the “clean” in “clean electricity”—could restart the moribund movement
towards increased electricity market competition (known as “restructuring”). While electricity restructuring gained considerable momentum from the late 1970s through the 1990s, the
movement was crippled by the high-profile Enron collapse in 2001. Efforts to restart the
debate have foundered as restructuring proponents have had no point of entry to connect
with consumers or influence policymakers in states dominated by incumbent electricity monopolies. Voluntary REC sales, which entail sale of an electricity “product” that bypasses the
physical transmission network, offers a “foot in the door” for new market entrants who can
connect with consumers and reshape their public image free from interference by the extant
monopoly. From a business standpoint, the benefit of entering the voluntary REC is less
about direct revenues or profits from the sale, the traditional economic markers of success.
Rather, REC sales are valuable for reasons well known to social movement theorists—they
can establish relationships and alliances in previously untapped social arenas and alter
public understandings of concepts and ideologies critical to the firm’s overall interests.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For most of its history, the American electricity market was seen
as the quintessential natural monopoly. Regulated both by state utility commissions (generation and retail sales) and the federal government (wholesale transmission), it was assumed that electricity
markets were unamenable to competition due to the high cost and
inherently inefficient nature of replicating the massive infrastructure
of transmission lines and local connectors necessary for a workable
electricity grid. However, beginning almost accidentally with the
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA),1 and continuing in
earnest through the 1990s, this began to change. Led by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), open-access rules were designed to create a level playing field for new market-entrants who
could piggyback on previously created infrastructure at competitive
rates. These reforms, known as electricity deregulation or restructuring, promised consumers a true choice in their electricity provider
and with it a new era of electricity competition.
Today, this momentum has largely stalled out. California aborted
its transition to electricity competition following the 2000 energy crisis and Enron collapse, and many states which had previously been
considering deregulating their electricity markets likewise held those
plans in abeyance. As of 2010, over a dozen states (largely but not
exclusively in the Northeast) have implemented electricity deregulation.2 Concerns over market volatility and entrenched opposition
from local utility monopolies and regulators have halted competition
in the remainder of the United States.
This Article suggests that there may be a possibility for electricity
competition to regain its footing—and it may stem from an unlikely
source: the marketing and sale of voluntary Renewable Energy Credits (RECs). RECs are, in essence, purchases of the “clean” in “clean
electricity.” Specifically, they guarantee that a certain amount of
clean electricity has been added to the grid. Voluntary RECs are
those purchased by individual customers as part of an effort to be
responsible citizens (as opposed to RECs that are purchased by utili-

1. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 15, 16, 26, 30, 42, and 43 U.S.C.).
2. See Status of Electricity Restructuring by State, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Sept.
2010), http://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/restructuring/restructure_elect.html.
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ties and other service providers to satisfy mandatory renewable energy purchase obligations) and comprise a significant share of overall
REC sales.3
Understandably, most scholarship on RECs has focused on their
environmental promise—for example, promoting the development of
green power sources or reducing quantities of air pollution.4 But the
relatively new emergence of RECs has caused scholars to overlook
how they are situated within, and may have unanticipated effects on,
the broader electricity marketplace.5 This Article provides the first
substantive analysis of how REC markets might impact larger debates over electricity restructuring. Analyzing the issue from a novel
law-and-social-movements perspective, I contend that voluntary REC
sales offer a unique opportunity for external market participants to
get a “foot in the door” within otherwise closed monopoly states.
From there, they can build up political influence (and a consumer
base) that will allow them a more realistic chance of influencing the
insular state regulatory bodies which largely control the restructuring agenda.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces the idea of
applying the literature on social movements to the business and economic sector (here, electricity markets). Social movement literature
has traditionally focused on issues like abortion, gay marriage, or
environmentalism; applying these tools to debates over regulated in3. See JENNY HEETER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, TECH. REP., NREL/TP-6A2056128, MARKET BRIEF: STATUS OF THE VOLUNTARY RENEWABLE ENERGY CERTIFICATE
MARKET (2011 DATA) 4-6 (2012), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy12osti/56128.pdf
(estimating a roughly 20% increase in voluntary REC sales between 2010 and 2011); Lori
Bird & Elizabeth Lokey, Interaction of Compliance and Voluntary Renewable Energy
Markets, ELECTRICITY J., Jan.-Feb. 2008, at 18, 19 (pegging the voluntary REC market as
comprising approximately 20% of all REC sales with a 35% annual growth rate); Michael
Gillenwater, Redefining RECs—Part 1: Untangling Attributes and Offsets, 36 ENERGY
POL’Y 2109, 2111 (2008) (“The voluntary purchase of RECs accounted for 46 percent of US
consumer green power sales in 2005, and REC markets are growing faster than other
segments of green power markets.”).
4. See, e.g., Magali A. Delmas & Maria J. Montes-Sancho, U.S. State Policies for
Renewable Energy: Context and Effectiveness, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 2273 (2011); Jesse
Glickstein, Comment, New York’s Proposed Solar Renewable Energy Market: Lessons
Learned from Other States’ SREC Markets and Recommendations in Moving Forward, 30
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1248 (2013); Matthew McDonnell et al., The Potential and Power of
Renewable Energy Credits to Enhance Air Quality and Economic Development in Arizona,
43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 809, 809-11 (2011). In addition, most scholarship on RECs has focused on
a particular subset of the market—their use in complying with state-mandated Renewable
Portfolio Standards (RPS) (the compliance market). This overlooks the function of the
voluntary market in purchasing RECs—in which end-user consumers elect to purchase
RECs to offset some or all of the portion of their electricity supply that comes from nonrenewable sources. See infra Part II.A.
5. Cf. Lincoln L. Davies, Alternative Energy and the Energy-Environment Disconnect,
46 IDAHO L. REV. 473, 474 (2010) (“It is one of the most important—and unspoken—
paradoxes of the modern American regulatory state: Energy law and environmental law
rarely, if ever, merge.”).
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dustries is decidedly less common. Yet a social movement approach
can provide useful insights on seemingly standard firm behavior—
pressing for regulatory reform and even marketing products to consumers—and doing so illuminates otherwise unappreciated elements
in the development of energy market regulation. Energy market participants behave like social movement actors in seeking to manage
and influence surrounding stakeholders and parties as a means of
accessing and altering political and regulatory structures. Several
critical moments in the history of electricity regulation—the initial
move (at the turn of the century) towards a monopoly model of electricity regulation, the later challenges to that model (beginning in the
1970s), and the retrenchment of the monopolies (following the Enron
collapse)—were significantly influenced by, and in large part enacted
through, social movement processes.
Part II discusses Renewable Energy Credits—the “clean” in “clean
electricity.” Though RECs are traded in two primary markets, legal
scholarship to date has focused entirely on one—the “compliance”
market whereby RECs are purchased by utilities to meet statemandated Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS). This Article is the
first full law review article to substantially address the second, “voluntary,” REC market.6 In the voluntary market, individual consumers buy RECs to offset some or all of their “dirty” power usage. This
Part introduces the mechanics of this market, as well as some of the
unique policy dilemmas posed by voluntary REC sales. It then proceeds to situate REC regulation within the division of state and federal responsibility that characterizes the electricity market generally.
Voluntary RECs are uniquely positioned, as they are neither the
clear domain of state or federal regulatory bodies. Although voluntary REC sales are almost always interstate, the federal government
has largely disclaimed any responsibility over them (save generic
consumer protection standards administered through the FTC). And
while states have robustly regulated the REC compliance market
(which makes sense, given that these markets are created through
state regulatory mandates), there is a scarcity of rulemaking on voluntary REC sales. The Dormant Commerce Clause, moreover, significantly constrains the ability of state regulators to maintain a monopoly in the REC context akin to what is permissible in retail electricity distribution generally.
Finally, Part III explains why these characteristics of the voluntary REC market provide a unique opportunity to restart the debate
over retail electricity competition in monopoly states. Electricity
6. For other key resources on voluntary RECs, see Gillenwater, supra note 3, at
2109; Kelly Crandall, Comment, Trust and the Green Consumer: The Fight for
Accountability in Renewable Energy Credits, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 893 (2010).
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competition has long struggled against the simple logistical fact that
a natural monopoly—whoever controls the wires—stands between
producers of power and their ultimate consumers. Voluntary RECs
are unique in the energy marketplace in that they offer an opportunity for consumers, even in states that otherwise lack electricity competition, to engage directly with the electricity marketplace. In short,
through voluntary RECs foreign players in the electricity market can
sell an “electricity product” (albeit not electricity itself) directly to
consumers—even in monopoly states.
Voluntary REC sales do not alter who actually provides the customer with electricity, nor do they logically mandate that such sales
be permitted. But voluntary REC sales still can provide a boost to
competitive forces by altering the political landscape of monopoly
states. Even limited competition creates stakeholders who might favor broader liberalization of the marketplace and, by virtue of their
new foothold in monopoly states, will be better positioned to advocate
for reforms. Moreover, REC providers can seek to convert their consumers into constituents—leveraging their interaction with their
customer base to create grassroots momentum for other friendly reforms (either full competition or partial measures such as increased
support for distributed generation). This mechanism—relatively
small avenues of competition creating momentum for further liberalization—has been a recurrent theme in the history of electricity market deregulation.
To be clear, I am not taking a position on the policy merits of retail electricity restructuring. This is a complicated issue under the
best of circumstances, and it is compounded by the unique energy
landscape of each of the fifty states which must ultimately decide—
one way or the other—whether to allow retail competition. Nor am I
arguing that retail restructuring will necessarily have positive environmental effects—this, too, is controversial and uncertain, and it
may be that the regulated or deregulated structure of the market has
little ultimate effect on environmental outcomes.7 This Article is rather descriptive in nature: the voluntary REC market offers the opportunity for greater competition within the electricity sector regardless of whether state utility commissions want it or not, and that in

7. See, e.g., M.K. Heiman, Expectations for Renewable Energy Under Market
Restructuring: The U.S. Experience, 31 ENERGY 1052, 1058-61 (2006) (noting that there
appears to be little pattern to regulated and deregulated states’ approaches in promoting
renewable energy consumption); Karen Palmer & Dallas Burtraw, The Environmental
Impacts of Electricity Restructuring: Looking Back and Looking Forward, 1
ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 171, 203 (2006) (“The lessons from our experience with
restructuring to date . . . suggest that other factors affecting the electricity sector may have
bigger effects on the environment and on electricity consumers than the move to
competition.”).
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turn provides an opening for pro-competition entities to gain a foothold and press the case in otherwise inhospitable terrain.
II. ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING AS SOCIAL MOVEMENT
The “social movement” as a concept in law and social sciences,
rarely is applied to a field as seemingly staid and buttoned-up as the
energy sector. Yet, in the context of many important developments in
electricity market regulation, a social movement approach provides
important insights. As will be explained in more depth below, the development of electricity market regulation has long been characterized by competing stakeholders who sought to form and reform this
regulatory structure to suit their discrete interests. One of the more
stark manifestations of this social conflict was the debate over electricity restructuring—whether to abandon the protected electricity
monopoly and instead introduce market-based competition. This debate, which played out across nearly every state as well as the federal government, pitted several large institutional players against each
other—including federal and state agencies, insurgent electricity
suppliers, and incumbent monopolies.
The cluster of energy market participants who favor restructuring
retail markets—changing the way that the electricity market functions in a manner which would inevitably alter the distribution of the
fruits of that market—represents a social movement. Their opponents in the electricity sector (incumbent monopolies, certain utility
commissions, etc.) in turn comprise the “countermovement.”8 Thinking of the restructuring debate in social movement terms helps illuminate how the comparatively minor arena of REC sales can alter
the relevant political dynamics of the electricity restructuring debate
more generally.
A. Social Movements Analysis and Firm Behavior
When we hear about “social movements,” we tend to think about
hot-button social issues such as gay rights, the environment, or abortion.9 Few scholars have attempted to apply social movement insights
8. See Mayer N. Zald & Bert Useem, Movement and Countermovement Interaction:
Mobilization, Tactics, and State Involvement, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN AN
ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY 247, 247-48 (Mayer N. Zald & John D. McCarthy eds., 1987)
(“[M]ovements of any visibility and impact create the conditions for the mobilization of
countermovements. By advocating change, by attacking the established interests, by
mobilizing symbols and raising costs to others, they create grievances and provide
opportunities for organizational entrepreneurs to define countermovement goals and
issues.”); David S. Meyer & Suzanne Staggenborg, Movements, Countermovements, and the
Structure of Political Opportunity, 101 AM. J. SOC. 1628, 1630 (1996) (“Any social movement
of potential political significance will generate opposition.”).
9. See, e.g., DONATELLA DELLA PORTA & MARIO DIANI, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: AN
INTRODUCTION 1-2 (2009) (tracing the genesis of the research into social movements to
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to business and economic disputes (at least without a traditional progressive hook, as in labor or environmental disputes, wherein the
business is typically cast as the antagonist). Scholars sometimes specifically separate out “economic” and “social” actors, with “social
movements” being a component of the latter set.10 After all, economic
motives can easily explain why firms expend effort to persuade policymakers to alter regulatory structures (not to mention why they try
to persuade consumers to purchase their offerings).11 Hence, it is unsurprising that social movement theory initially grew out of a desire
to explain mass action in contexts such as the environmental movement, where there were no obvious incentives for coordination.12
But while perhaps the “why” of business behavior is not illuminated by social movement literature, the “how” certainly is. There is,
after all, more than one way to turn a profit—indeed, one of the
hallmarks of the modern capitalist system is that it nuzzles out profit
opportunities regardless of how the regulatory system is contoured.
Self-interest can take us only so far in determining why the opportunities proffered by certain regulatory structures are preferred over
others and why particular economic opportunities are recognized and
pursued (or overlooked and dismissed) in particular social contexts.13
Moreover, noting the obvious truth that firms want favorable policies
or friendly consumers does little to explain how they succeed in bringing that state of affairs into existence. Social movement behavior
radical protests in the late 1960s); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social
Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L.
REV. 1323, 1328 n.13 (2006) (collecting articles devoted to “the role of social movements in
constitutional change”). I am as guilty of this sin as any in my own social movement
related scholarship, which has primarily focused on issues of race and sexual orientation.
See, e.g., David Schraub, Sticky Slopes, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1249 (2013) [hereinafter
Schraub, Sticky Slopes]; David Schraub, The Perils and Promise of the Holder Memo, 2012
CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 187.
10. See Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the Door: Social Movement Literature and
Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2001) (distinguishing between the “economic”
and “social” spheres of public life and stating that “[s]ocial movements belong to this
[social] sphere of society”).
11. See Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice, Phenomenology, and the Meaning of the
Modern State: Keep the Bathwater, but Throw Out That Baby, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 309, 352
(2002) (“There is nothing cynical about treating the owner of a business, or a consumer
buying artichokes, as trying to maximize his material self-interest. . . . [Both] would
cheerfully agree that they are self-interest maximizing.”).
12. See Rubin, supra note 10, at 7 (noting that the environmentalism movement “was
remarkable for the diffuse and remote character of the concerns that animated its
participants, for the lack of any particularized economic interests in its basic goals, and for
the sophisticated organizational efforts that sustained it”).
13. See Rubin, supra note 11, at 346 (arguing against an “ahistorical” public choice
theory and contending that social actors are motivated by “intersubjective understandings
[that] are heavily dependent on temporally specific attitudes and the evolution of ideas
from one generation to the next”); id. at 351 (noting the importance of “agenda-setting” as
the “pre-empirical and generally pre-analytic” set of decisions that govern how social actors
determine “where [they] will go and what [they] will look for”).

944

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:937

bridges the gap between the desire of firms to alter economic or regulatory climates and actually effectuating the change.
In this vein, a growing body of literature explores the intersection
of social movements and business behavior.14 Business organizations
“are strategic actors, intent on maintaining their social position and
influencing their environment.”15 Threats from opposing social
groups—for example, a consumer boycott—can challenge “an organization’s field position, undermining the ‘existing relationships and
meanings and order’ by which that position is defined.”16 Consequently, firms have no choice but to participate in the field of social movement activity in order to preserve and expand their economic
opportunities.
As Brayden King and Mary-Hunter McDonnell note, articles exploring the intersection of social movements and business practice
typically focus “only on direct responses such as wins or losses, resistance or concession.”17 We know something about the outcomes of
social movement/business interaction but very little about the processes through which these interactions take place. And even scholars who are interrogating the “how” question usually start with the
presumption that social movements and firms are oppositional and
proceed to explore how businesses strategically manage the threats
posed by social movement activism. For example, firms might engage
in prosocial behavior to burnish their image in response to a consumer boycott.18 In certain situations, firms may even align or sponsor a
social movement boycott targeted at certain practices in order to
head off more radical critiques of their own behavior.19
In other words, while this literature has examined how firms respond to social movements, and occasionally looks to their participation in social movements, it has not yet identified the firm as a social
14. See, e.g., Mary-Hunter McDonnell & Brayden King, Keeping up Appearances:
Reputational Threat and Impression Management After Social Movement Boycotts, 58
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 387 (2013); Edward T. Walker & Christopher M. Rea, The Political
Mobilization of Firms and Industries, 40 ANN. REV. SOC. 281 (2014); Mary-Hunter
McDonnell, If You Can’t Beat Them, Join Them: Corporate Sponsorship of Social
Movement Boycotts (Aug. 29, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2137371.
15. McDonnell & King, supra note 14, at 388.
16. Id. (quoting Neil Fligstein & Doug McAdam, Toward a General Theory of Strategic
Action Fields, 29 SOC. THEORY 1, 5 (2011)).
17. Id. (citing Brayden G. King, A Political Mediation Model of Corporate Response to
Social Movement Activism, 53 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 395 (2008)); see also Joseph E. Luders, The
Economics of Movement Success: Business Responses to Civil Rights Mobilization, 111 AM.
J. SOC. 963, 964 (2006); Rachel Schurman, Fighting “Frankenfoods”: Industry Opportunity
Structures and the Efficacy of the Anti-Biotech Movement in Western Europe, 51 SOC.
PROBS. 243 (2004).
18. See McDonnell & King, supra note 14, at 388-89.
19. See id. at 389.
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movement. That is to say, run-of-the-mill industry behavior—
lobbying to alter regulatory climates or deciding to introduce new
market products—has not typically been characterized in social
movement terms. Yet there is no principled reason for this gap.20 Social movements can encompass all sorts of ends—they represent
nothing more than “a set of opinions and beliefs in a population
which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society.”21 Social movements are a species of social conflict wherein opposing actors engage,
negotiate, or fight to control particular social resources.22 The day-today ends of a business—protecting and enhancing market share,
identifying and exploiting economic opportunities—certainly qualify
as among the sort of resources social actors will fight to attain. Social
movement analysis can thereby provide novel modes of identifying
and analyzing avenues of change relevant to firms.
The social movement perspective offers assistance in identifying
productive firm behavior in three ways. First, it broadens who is considered to be a relevant player in producing the sorts of changes desired by economic actors. Political and economic change is multidirectional; it emerges from a multitude of different sources both near and
far from the immediate point of controversy.23 The relationship between a movement and the political or social structures it seeks to
influence is not hermetically sealed off from surrounding society—
social movements influence and are influenced by forces which on
their face appear to be entirely external to the competing combatants. Seemingly unrelated social forces or unengaged political actors
can have profound impacts on the success or failure of the movement’s

20. See, e.g., Neil Fligstein, Markets as Politics: A Political-Cultural Approach to
Market Institutions, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 656, 657 (1996) (identifying firms as social
movement actors engaged in an attempt to control the relevant market place).
21. John D. McCarthy & Mayer N. Zald, Resource Mobilization and Social Movements:
A Partial Theory, 82 AM. J. SOC. 1212, 1217-18 (1977).
22. See Alain Touraine, An Introduction to the Study of Social Movements, 52 SOC.
RES. 749, 750-51 (1985) (identifying social movements as a special sort of social conflict and
arguing that a “conflict presupposes a clear definition of opponents or competiting [sic]
actors and of the resources they are fighting for or negotiating to take control of”).
23. Sometimes the social movement dynamic is described as “bidirectional ” in that
while the effects of social movement lobbying influence politics, political dynamics also
impact the internal structure and preferences of social movement actors. See Cary
Coglianese, Social Movements, Law, and Society: The Institutionalization of the
Environmental Movement, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 85, 86 (2001) (noting that “law reform efforts
themselves may have an impact on public opinion, with action by courts and other legal
institutions sometimes lending legitimacy to the claims advanced by social movements”). I
prefer “multidirectional” to emphasize how even entities that are not directly implicated in
the movement or regulatory structure can have outsized impacts on the development of
social change.
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agenda. These dynamics are as relevant to the sorts of social developments sought by businesses as they are to those pursued by more
traditional movements.
The social movement literature (as the name implies) generally
views all of society as its canvas. This is a broader outlook than one
typically finds in the economic context, which focuses on those entities whose direct financial or institutional stakes in the relevant industry give them straightforward, rational incentives to act.24 So
while an economic account of electricity regulation might focus on the
utility companies or federal and state regulatory commissions, it
would likely pay little attention to, say, the travails of a local trolley
car franchise25 or trends in economic theorizing.26 But even in relatively arcane and highly regulated contexts, the development and
alteration of regulatory structures involves much more than big companies lobbying big agencies in a void.27 Often times, it is precisely
these seemingly external and unrelated social players that play an
outsized influence in how social change progresses.
To understand the manner in which “unaffiliated” actors can affect the course of social reform, consider accounts about how social
movement victories can act to “mobilize” supporters (or “countermobilize” opponents). The traditional form of this story
assumes a simple bifurcation between the supporters and opponents of [the policy], with a substantial chunk of the population
indifferent and on the sidelines. A major victory by the supporters
of [the policy] mobilizes its opponents, who see their interests or
values threatened, but it does not affect those who had no opinion
on the matter in the first place 28

But it is evident that this divide does not always hold—a social
movement victory can alter the relevant political coalitions entirely,
for example, by “threatening the[] discrete and previously unaffected
interests” of hitherto neutral groups.29 Likewise, it can add supporters if the victory creates new bonds of affinity or interest that link
together groups previously disconnected from the relevant social con24. See Rubin, supra note 11, at 310-11 (noting the assumption of public choice
theorists that behavior emerges from rational actors seeking to maximize their selfinterest).
25. See infra notes 55-58.
26. See infra notes 71-74.
27. See Walker & Rea, supra note 14, at 293 (“[T]he politics of business need not be
confined to explicit attempts to elect sympathetic candidates or facilitate the work of
friendly legislators. Business may also act as an activist and an issue entrepreneur, with
clear economic interests but, to that end, with a clear focus on developing political and
ideological support of its policy positions.”) (citation omitted).
28. Schraub, Sticky Slopes, supra note 9, at 1259.
29. Id. at 1259-60.
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troversy. In this way, analyzing social movement reform prospects
requires keen attention not just to engaged players or even those
with obviously relevant but currently “inactive” interests.30 “Neighboring” social spaces31 also can play an important role in social
movement prospects where particular reform paths create the opportunity to mobilize parties which might otherwise be disinterested.
Nor should this analysis restrict itself solely to traditional political
developments. Technological and economic changes, too, can shift
relevant social movement dynamics and create new opportunities for
coalition-building and political lobbying.32 Jack Balkin and Reva
Siegel use the example of copyright in the internet age—
technological innovations sharpened the tension between intellectual
property rights and First Amendment protections, and stakeholders
on both sides mobilized to promote different regulatory theories protective of their interests (and, I would add, exploit the regulatory lacunae that became apparent as the technological landscape outpaced
formal governing laws and policies).33
Second, a social movement perspective gives insight into the processes by which firm behavior is altered by surrounding social climates. The move to the regulated-monopoly model of electricity regulation in the early twentieth century, for example, profoundly influenced how electricity utilities were perceived by the public (partners
in a shared enterprise of prosperity rather than rapacious robber
barons); it also had the not-unintentional effect of locking the thendominant electricity providers into a privileged (and nearunassailable) economic position.34 And the reforms need not be so obviously stark to have outsized impacts. Seemingly small changes in a
political, economic, or regulatory structure can have big effects if they

30. ERIC M. PATASHNIK, REFORMS AT RISK: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER MAJOR POLICY
CHANGES ARE ENACTED 156 (2008) (noting the importance of the “potential preferences of
constituents who could become active and attentive if provoked”).
31. “Neighboring,” in this context, means a social entity that is not directly implicated
in the controversy but nonetheless maintains significant connections to the participants.
For example, in the desegregation context, advocates of community schooling would be a
neighboring space—they did not have an inherent stake in the debate but their interests
were variously implicated by either side as the desegregation movement progressed. See
Schraub, Sticky Slopes, supra note 9, at 1260 & n.40. In the electricity restructuring
context, examples of potential neighboring spaces might include land use advocates, solar
panel manufacturers, or industrial trade organizations.
32. See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements,
154 U. PA. L. REV. 927, 933 (2006) (“[T]echnological and economic changes produce political
contestation and social movement organization that in turn mediate the significance of
such changes in the legal system.”).
33. Id.
34. See infra Part I.B.1.
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alter (for example) which groups have access to consumers, regulators, and other important stakeholders.35
Social movements, of course, are constantly crafting changes both
large and small in the communities they operate in. These changes
create new political and economic opportunities that can destabilize
even longstanding social arrangements. In their study of the development of the American wind energy market, Wesley Sine and Brandon Lee identify several means by which social movement activity
can create or promote new entrepreneurial opportunities. First, it can
disrupt traditional institutional arrangements, creating space for
new entrants.36 Second, it can alter the values favored by regulators,
“creating supportive contexts for new types of entrepreneurial activity.”37 Third, it can reduce the costs of identifying and mobilizing
around new opportunities by elevating the salience of hitherto unrecognized opportunities.38 Each of these dynamics can be observed over
the course of the history of electricity regulation.
For example, the burgeoning environmental movement spurred
the passage of PURPA as a means of enabling small, more sustainable generators into the electricity market. This development had the
unexpected side effect of cracking open the generation sector and in
doing so, falsified the long-standing presumption that large generation projects (of the sort that could only be launched by a stateguaranteed monopoly) were the most cost-effective means of producing power.39 Likewise, the “trend” of deregulation—which by the
1970s had become a popular slogan of reform for both consumer advocates and economic theorists—played an important role in changing how an important regulatory actor (FERC) assessed its stance
vis-à-vis the electricity industry.40 Part IV will suggest that one reason the growing voluntary REC market might help renew the push
for electricity competition is that it provides a means for foreign entrants to get a “foot in the door” in otherwise closed marketplaces,
giving them a foothold from which they can more effectively lobby
policymakers and constituents.41

35. Cf. Amy Hillman & Gerald Keim, International Variation in the BusinessGovernment Interface: Institutional and Organizational Considerations, 20 ACAD. MGMT.
REV. 193, 212 (1995) (noting the range of formal and informal constraints which effect how
businesses interface with regulators and policymakers).
36. See Wesley D. Sine & Brandon H. Lee, Tilting at Windmills? The Environmental
Movement and the Emergence of the U.S. Wind Energy Sector, 54 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 123, 124
(2009).
37. Id.
38. See id.
39. See infra notes 64-70.
40. See infra notes 71-74.
41. See infra Part III.
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Third, the social movement account recognizes and explores how
firms affirmatively shape attitudes and create support for their preferred structures. Companies are “actively engaged in the production
and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers,” “framing” events or activities to carry friendly, amenable meanings.42 Creative entrepreneurs find ways to link
discrete interests of unaffiliated groups to previously irrelevant policy debates or create bonds of affinity that cause the group to consider
itself an ally of the entrepreneur’s project. Companies regularly seek
to develop these relationships with their consumers, through ad
campaigns, marketing, and other activities designed to create a sense
of kinship and social bond.43 Much of the instinct behind corporate
leveraging of “grassroots” (or grassroots-like) social mobilization lies
precisely in the fact that it is perceived as less obviously selfinterested than pure corporate lobbying.44
Again, this opportunity for firms to construct favorable conditions
for pursuing their economic agenda resonates with the story I will
tell in Part IV. The voluntary REC market has the potential to give
foreign firms unprecedented access to consumers in monopoly states.
And the context of that access could not be more pro-social: Environmentalism! Responsible consumption! Saving the planet! This access
can be leveraged to create positive relationships with the broader
electricity consumption community, and that in turn can significantly
alter the political terrain faced by state utility commissioners who
would otherwise face little countervailing pressure to that exerted by
the incumbent monopolies.
In short, the social movements approach allows for a society-wide
lens, even in seemingly narrow and esoteric contexts. In terms of specific firm behaviors, it looks to how companies respond to newly created opportunities that emerge when preexisting political, social, or
economic arrangements are reshuffled; it also recognizes and explores how firms create these alterations to promote amenable
change. These insights will form the locus of the story, told in Part
IV, of how voluntary REC sales could have an outsized impact on retail electricity restructuring debates. Before turning to that, however,
it is useful to briefly explore the prior history of electricity market
competition from inside this social movement lens.
42. Robert D. Benford & David A. Snow, Framing Processes and Social Movements:
An Overview and Assessment, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 611, 613 (2000); see McDonnell & King,
supra note 14, at 389 (“Organizations rely on the approval of relevant others, or ‘target
audiences,’ to obtain needed resources and survive. As part of their ongoing impression
management efforts, organizations make claims and engage in performances that cultivate
positive perceptions among these audiences.”) (citations omitted).
43. See infra Part III.B.
44. See Walker & Rea, supra note 14, at 292-93.

950

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:937

B. Electricity Monopolies and Electricity Restructuring:
Three Vignettes
Even compared against other elements of the modern administrative state, electricity markets are governed by an unusually complex
regulatory structure. A full account of this history has been done
with great thoroughness elsewhere and is beyond the scope of this
Article.45 Here, I provide three short vignettes from critical moments
in the history of electricity regulation that help demonstrate the usefulness of the social movements perspective. Viewing these developments—the origins of the electricity monopoly, the emergent challenge by competition advocates to that model, and the eventual
stalling of restructuring efforts—from a social movement lens illuminates how even seemingly pure economic decisions are impacted by
sociological considerations. This characteristic will become critical in
understanding the outsized role REC trading may play in pushing
the restructuring debate forward in the coming years.
1. The Development of Energy Monopolies
In its first few decades, electricity production and sales were
largely unregulated.46 Competition thrived as a multitude of new
firms sought to gain market share over the terra nova of the electricity marketplace. By the 1920s, however, the electricity market quickly
began to consolidate, as technology allowed greater levels of energy
production and firms started to take advantage of economies of
scale.47 Starting at the turn of the twentieth century, farsighted electricity executives saw the benefits of removing their industry from
the unbridled free market and instead ensconcing themselves as publicly regulated industries.
Electricity seemed to be the quintessential example of a natural
monopoly.48 Effective competition between firms would require the
creation of multiple redundant and inefficient power transmission
and distribution systems. As early as 1898, electricity mogul Samuel
Insull warned against the ruinous effects of electricity competition
and urged the creation of publicly regulated electricity monopolies

45. For a more thorough discussion, see generally RICHARD F. HIRSH, POWER LOSS:
THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND RESTRUCTURING IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY
SYSTEM (1999); Joseph P. Tomain, Electricity Restructuring: A Case Study in Government
Regulation, 33 TULSA L.J. 827 (1998).
46. See Tomain, supra note 45, at 830.
47. Id.
48. See RICHARD A. POSNER, NATURAL MONOPOLY AND ITS REGULATION 1 (1999)
(defining a natural monopoly as where the “entire demand within a relevant market can be
satisfied at lowest cost by one firm rather than by two or more”).
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with exclusive franchise areas.49 This proposal evolved into the idea
of a “regulatory compact” whereby the government “would set the
rates that the monopoly could charge and would allow (as opposed to
‘guarantee’) the utility to earn a reasonable return on its prudent
capital investment.”50
The regulatory compact had several things going for it as a policy
matter. From a regulatory perspective, this model recognized the
utilities’ natural monopoly while guarding against discriminatory
practices or exploitative pricing.51 From a social standpoint, the compact was a quintessential example of progressive-era regulation,
“built on principles of scientific management and regulation by experts” rather than easily swayed (and bought) legislators.52 From the
vantage of the utility industry, state regulation gave them a guaranteed customer base and locked in the existing industry structure in
which the incumbent monopolies were dominant.53 Judicial decisions
which protected the utilities’ right to a reasonable return on their
investment provided further reason for utilities to support this regulatory structure.54
Nonetheless, it was not impossible to imagine the regulatory compact meeting stiff political opposition. How the public perceived the
compact depended, in large part, on how it was framed.55 One could
49. See Richard D. Cudahy & William D. Henderson, From Insull to Enron: Corporate
(Re)Regulation After the Rise and Fall of Two Energy Icons, 26 ENERGY L.J. 35, 46 (2005)
(“Insull argued that the entire industry had been held back by wasteful competition that
‘frightens the investor, and compels corporations to pay a very high price for capital.’
According to Insull, the best service at the lowest possible cost could only be obtained
through a monopoly provider that had an exclusive geographic franchise.”) (footnote
omitted).
50. Tomain, supra note 45, at 832.
51. HIRSH, supra note 45, at 26-27.
52. William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1614,
1640 (2014) (noting that these laws generally provided for wide regulatory mandates and
independent management by area experts).
53. HIRSH, supra note 45, at 27-29; see also Boyd, supra note 52, at 1643 (noting that
the rate and franchise guarantees also allowed utilities to favorably access capital markets
necessary for investment in electricity infrastructure).
54. See, e.g., Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944)
(“The rate-making process . . . involves a balancing of the investor and the consumer
interests. . . . From the investor or company point of view it is important that there be
enough revenue not only for operating expenses but also for the capital costs of the
business.”); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 546 (1898) (holding, in the railroad context, “that
the basis of all calculations as to the reasonableness of rates to be charged by a corporation
maintaining a highway under legislative sanction must be the fair value of the property
being used by it for the convenience of the public”).
55. See Schraub, Sticky Slopes, supra note 9, at 1309 (“Framing theory . . . argues that
social movements are not simply responding to pre-existing dynamics necessarily flowing
from particular institutional or social arrangements. Rather, they are in the business of
creating and manipulating what social facts mean in the context of their constituencies,
their opponents, and the surrounding polity.”) (footnote omitted).

952

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:937

present the relationship as protecting industry and consumer alike
from the debilitating effects of voracious, unrestrained competition.
But one could also portray it as naked protectionism for entrenched
robber barons who could easily capture the commissions that were
supposedly “policing” them. The latter possibility was not theoretical
and turned primarily on how the public perceived the relevant actors
and their behavior. Insull had, as a cautionary tale, the case of Chicago street-car magnate Charles Yerkes. Yerkes had also attempted
to convert his empire into a similar publicly regulated monopoly, but
he was stymied due, in large part, to the fact that he was reviled by
most of his customers.56
Insull was determined not to meet the same fate. He launched an
expansive campaign to ensure that electricity consumers saw public
utilities as allies rather than adversaries. This included a popular
“consumer ownership” model which sold stock to electricity customers
as well as aggressive promotion of the sale of electric appliances and
gadgets for home use.57 Placing electricity utilities under the ambit of
state regulatory commissions was presented as part of a larger public
framing in which the utilities and consumers were on the same side.
In short, while the monopoly model of electricity regulation could
be explained in terms of self-interest (of the regulators and of the
utilities), this does not alter the fact that this arrangement was not a
foregone conclusion. It needed to be sold to the public, and the sale
needed to successfully construct the creation of an electricity monopoly as in the best interest of industry and public alike. Insull’s campaigns “select[ed] some aspects of a perceived reality”—namely, those
elements which drew together industry and consumer—“and ma[d]e
them more salient” as a means of constructing the social understanding of Insull’s reform efforts.58 And unlike Yerkes, Insull was quite
successful: while his empire collapsed during the Great Depression,
the regulatory compact model he forged endured for decades
thereafter.
2. PURPA and the Push Towards Deregulation
The regulatory compact was based off a perceived unity of interests between the electricity industry and electricity consumers. Both
favored significant expansion of the availability of plentiful and
cheap electricity. Electricity utilities, of course, wanted to expand
their customer base (and sell more power to them), and electricity
consumers had bought into the notion that more power equaled a
56. See Cudahy & Henderson, supra note 49, at 47-48.
57. See id. at 52-53.
58. Robert M. Entman, Framing: Towards Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm, 43
J. COMM. 51, 52 (1993).
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greater quality of life. Technological innovation and increased electrification allowed for more electricity to be produced and consumed at
lower prices.
This accord, successful through the middle of the twentieth century, began to be challenged in the 1960s and 1970s. The first challenge
was a “plateau” in the electricity market which unsettled the assumptions that had provided for steady utility profits in the preceding decades.59 As rates of consumption and technological innovation
both stalled, utilities could no longer obtain the stable rates of return
that they had previously enjoyed. This problem was exacerbated by
perverse incentives created by the regulatory compact—because utilities were generally entitled to recover their “costs” (plus a reasonable
profit), utilities were encouraged to overinvest in capital improvements, overbuilding supply and otherwise increasing prices.60 While
nominally the requirement that recovered costs be “prudently” incurred could have provided a check on overexpansion, functionally
commissions were reluctant to second-guess business management
decisions by regulated utilities.61
The burgeoning environmental movement also destabilized the
perception of everyday consumers and electricity utilities as natural
allies. Increased electricity production did not only mean cheaper
prices and better gadgets; it also entailed greater pollution and significant environmental challenges.62 Moreover, environmentally conscious consumers did not necessarily favor the (high-pollutions) types
of energy resources utilized by the incumbent monopolies.63 The
emergent gap between consumer preferences and utility practices
imperiled the incumbents’ historic political dominance in setting electricity policy.

59. Joseph P. Tomain, The Past and Future of Electricity Regulation, 32 ENVTL. L.
435, 450 (2002) (“Starting roughly in 1965, the industry reached technological and
financial plateaus at which industry expansion slowed considerably; economies of scale
were not being realized, costs were increasing, generation was overbuilt, and alternative
providers were coming into the market.”).
60. See id.
61. FERC has articulated a presumption of prudence which recognizes “that
managers of a utility have broad discretion in conducting their business affairs and in
incurring costs necessary to provide services to their customers.” New England Power Co.,
31 FERC ¶ 61,047, 61,084 (1985). The prudence test looks to whether the incurred costs
are those which “a reasonable utility management . . . would have made, in good faith,
under the same circumstances, and at the relevant point in time.” Id. Even if “in hindsight
it may be clear that a management decision was wrong,” prudence is measured “based on
the particular circumstances existing either at the time the challenged costs were actually
incurred, or the time the utility became committed to incur those expenses.” Id.
62. See Sine & Lee, supra note 38, at 131 (noting the increase in attention
environmental groups began to give to energy issues).
63. See id. at 126.
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The key development in this story is the passage of the Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) in 1978.64 Designed to increase efficiency and remedy certain defects in the electricity regulatory regime, PURPA contained a seemingly unassuming provision
enabling certain “Qualifying Facilities” (QFs) to effectively enter the
electricity marketplace by requiring electric utilities to purchase
their power.65 PURPA defined a QF as either a cogeneration facility
(a facility which produces “steam or forms of useful energy (such as
heat) which are used for industrial, commercial, heating, or cooling
purposes” alongside its electric energy production),66 or “small power
production facilit[ies]” producing no more than 80 megawatts of energy through the use of renewable or other environmentally friendly
resources.67 Specifically, FERC interpreted PURPA as requiring that
utilities purchase power from QFs at their full-avoided cost—that is,
the cost the utility would have paid had it generated the electricity
itself (or purchased from another source).68
PURPA created an opportunity for small generators to compete so
long as they could produce energy for less than the big utilities’
avoided cost rates. The old assumption was that this would be a rare
occurrence—economies of scale would give big generators an insurmountable advantage in price. “What surprised everyone was how
much new nonutility generated electricity was available and how eager independent power producers (IPPs) were to enter the market.”69
As it turned out, QFs could consistently produce power below the
avoided cost of the monopoly generators, and thus they produced as
much electricity as PURPA allowed.70

64. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 15, 16, 26, 30, 42, and 43 U.S.C.).
65. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a) (2012); see FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 750 (1982)
(observing that PURPA was passed in part because “traditional electricity utilities were
reluctant to purchase power from, and to sell power to, the nontraditional facilities”);
Richard D. Cudahy, PURPA: The Intersection of Competition and Regulatory Policy, 16
ENERGY L.J. 419, 422 (1995) (noting that without a government mandate utilities “were
reluctant to purchase power from their potential competitors” and on the occasions they did
so “the prices they offered were not attractive”).
66. 16 U.S.C. § 796(18)(A) (2012).
67. Id. at § 796(17)(A) (stating that a small power production facility must produce
“electric energy solely by the use, as a primary energy source, of biomass, waste, renewable
resources, geothermal resources, or any combination thereof”).
68. See 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(b)(2) (2014); Cudahy, supra note 65, at 422 (“The price of
PURPA power, as prescribed by statute and interpreted by regulation, was full-avoided
cost, or the cost to a utility of generating the same energy or purchasing it from another
source.”); see also Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402 (1983)
(upholding FERC’s full-avoided cost rates and interconnection requirements under
PURPA).
69. Tomain, supra note 59, at 451-52.
70. Id. at 452.
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From a social movement perspective, there are two critical lessons
to be drawn from PURPA’s success. The first is straightforward: new
economic developments (the energy “plateau”), combined with a disruptive social movement (environmentalism), created a novel opportunity within a previously closed socio-economic institution (energy
markets). In stark contrast to the old model, which envisioned highcapacity (and normally high-polluting) power generators that could
only be built by large (and governmentally protected) utilities,
PURPA was geared towards small-scale, sustainable generation. The
second lesson is more subtle but perhaps more important: the relevant provision of PURPA was not, at the time, seen as a major reform. It was not perceived as the first step in a radical restructuring
of the energy sector. PURPA’s significance was that it created a foothold for new energy stakeholders—ones more attuned to the new
problems and public understandings surrounding energy—to enter
into the market.
The success of PURPA spurred a larger rethinking of the electricity market and the possibility of greater competition.71 A seemingly
unlikely alliance of consumer advocates like Ralph Nader and Chicago-school economists had already begun presenting deregulation as
an exciting, even trendy, means of reinvigorating hidebound regulated industries.72 Instead of viewing the regulatory compact as a public-spirited endeavor to ensure that all relevant electricity stakeholders were treated fairly, critics cast the monopoly as an example of
regulatory capture.73 FERC soon began exploring the possibility of
“restructuring” the industry to further push it away from a pure monopoly model, and it rapidly “became probably the most consistent
and important administrative agency in promoting the transition to”
competitive, deregulated markets.74
71. See id. at 453-54; HIRSH, supra note 45, at 119 (“Through its mostly unintended
consequences, PURPA inaugurated the process by which the traditional structure of the
utility system disintegrated.”).
72. See, e.g., Mark Green & Ralph Nader, Economic Regulation vs. Competition: Uncle
Sam the Monopoly Man, 82 YALE L.J. 871, 883-87 (1973); Symposium, 41 J. AIR L. & COM.
573 (1975) (symposium devoted to the possibility of deregulating the airline industry);
Harry M. Trebing, The Chicago School Versus Public Utility Regulation, 10 J. ECON.
ISSUES 97, 97-98 (1976). Cf. Sine & Lee, supra note 38, at 124 (noting the ability of social
movements to “embed their values into the regulatory structure, creating supportive
contexts for new types of entrepreneurial activity”).
73. See GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF
AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916, at 3 (1963) (“It is business control over politics (and by
‘business’ I mean the major economic interests) rather than political regulation of the
economy that is the significant phenomenon of the Progressive Era.”); Boyd, supra note 52,
at 1652 (observing that, for Chicago-school economists, “[p]ublic utility regulation was . . . a
product of rent-seeking behavior on the part of regulated firms; the idea of a general public
interest was tenuous at best”).
74. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1367 (1998).
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As William Boyd observes, the arguments against the utility’s
regulated-monopoly status were not unknown prior to the 1960s and
1970s, nor are they indisputably correct.75 Their influence derives
from the particular social position that had emerged at this time period, which allowed the utility monopoly to be reframed “as an example of the endemic problems afflicting government regulation and the
concomitant superiority of markets.”76 This critique had the temporally specific advantage of being able to pit a hypothetical free market against all of the grubby day-to-day failings of the monopoly.77
The pro-competition critique likely could not have gained traction if
there were not some economic and experiential bases for it; but viewing the debate solely within those terms overlooks essential sociological differences between the progressive-era dawn of the electricity
sector (a novel and fast moving industry in a society fearful of overpowered “robber barons”) and that which existed by mid-century (a
matured industry facing technological stagnation and significant environmental challenges).
3. Retail Competition: Competitive versus Monopoly States
PURPA’s move toward competition did not on its own spark a similar restructuring across the electricity sector—at least not universally. Of the three main segments of the electricity market—generation,
wholesale sales, and distribution—PURPA had effectively (if only
partially) introduced competition into the first.78 Outside the generation context, QFs had only limited access to the market—they could
sell to utilities at avoided-cost rates, but they had no means of accessing interstate transmission lines or selling to the ultimate retail consumers. The natural next step was to deregulate the electricity
transmission market. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 gave FERC general authority to order transmission companies to allow other power
companies to move power across their lines (known as “wheeling”).79
75. See Boyd, supra note 52, at 1656-57.
76. Id. at 1656.
77. See id. at 1657 (“Of course, comparing an ideal view of markets to real-world
regulation was never going to go in regulation’s favor . . . .”).
78. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 further advanced generation deregulation by
making it easier for non-QFs to access the market, albeit without the strong subsidies
provided by PURPA. See Jeffrey D. Watkiss & Douglas W. Smith, The Energy Policy Act of
1992—A Watershed for Competition in the Wholesale Power Market, 10 YALE J. ON REG.
447, 467-74 (1993) (detailing the new category of “exempt wholesale generators” created by
the Act). By 2001, non-utility generators accounted for 30% of all electricity generation.
Tomain, supra note 59, at 469.
79. See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 16 and 42 U.S.C.); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States,
410 U.S. 366, 368 (1973) (defining wheeling as the “transfer by direct transmission or
displacement electric power from one utility to another over the facilities of an
intermediate utility”).
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Whereas PURPA had permitted wheeling orders only where FERC
“determines that such order would reasonably preserve existing competitive relationships,”80 now FERC merely had to determine that
such an order was “in the public interest” and complied with general
requirements that the rates of service be “just and reasonable.”81 In
1996, FERC published Order 888,82 which required interstate transmission line operators to file a non-discriminatory tariff for use of
their power lines. Further, the pricing and usage of the transmission
lines had to be “unbundled” from other non-retail utility services,
preventing self-dealing and other anti-competitive practices meant to
favor the incumbent owners.83 Order 888 functionally deregulated the
wholesale market, and today FERC generally “regulates” wholesale
electricity rates by ensuring “the integrity of the interstate energy
markets,” rather than through direct ratemaking proceedings.84 The
last horizon for competition was sales to end-consumers, but FERC
was still without jurisdiction to introduce competition into the retail
sector.85 The Federal Power Act continued to delegate responsibility
over that segment of the electricity market to the states, and the Energy Policy Act of 1992 preserved state authority over retail wheeling.86 This created new challenges for competition advocates, because
thus far electricity restructuring had been promoted primarily at the
federal level. At the state level the interest group dynamics surrounding electricity restructuring became especially prominent.87
Some of these dynamics are quite straightforward. For example,
there are wide disparities in the average electricity rates paid by con-

80. See Energy Policy Act § 721 (amending 16 U.S.C. § 824j).
81. 16 U.S.C. § 824j(a) (2012) (“[T]he Commission may issue such [a wheeling] order if
it finds that such order meets the requirements of [16 U.S.C.] section 824k . . . and would
otherwise be in the public interest.”); § 824k(a) (providing that wholesale transmission
“rates, charges, terms, and conditions shall promote the economically efficient transmission
and generation of electricity and shall be just and reasonable, and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential”).
82. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities
and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (May 10, 1996) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R.
pts. 35, 385). See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002) (upholding Order 888).
83. See New York, 535 U.S. at 11-12 (noting that Order 888 required the “ ‘functional
unbundling’ of wholesale generation and transmission services” as well as unbundling
retail transmission services where the transmission occurred in interstate commerce).
84. N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. FERC, 744 F.3d 74, 81 (3d Cir. 2014).
85. See 16 U.S.C. § 824k(g)-(h) (2012) (prohibiting any FERC order “inconsistent with
[state] retail marketing areas” or which provides for “mandatory retail wheeling” to
consumers).
86. See HIRSH, supra note 45, at 244 (noting that under the Energy Policy Act “the
federal government would not mandate retail wheeling, but states could”).
87. See David B. Spence, The Politics of Electricity Restructuring: Theory vs. Practice,
40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 417, 423 (2005).
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sumers across different states.88 Where electricity rates are low, an
“if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” mentality may easily dominate the polity. Moreover, local investor-owned utilities also often oppose the curtailment of their monopolies, as this would disturb their “comfortable
life with a virtually guaranteed reasonable rate-of-return on investment.”89 But in addition to these concerns, state utility commissions
had special reason to be suspicious of electricity restructuring—
adopting it would effectively cede much of their regulatory power to
the federal government.
To understand why, it is necessary to quickly outline the basic
structure of federal versus state authority in the electricity context.
The Federal Power Act of 193590 split the regulatory responsibility for
electricity into three components: generation, transmission, and distribution.91 States were responsible for regulating the actual generation of power.92 The Federal Power Commission—now the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)—was granted jurisdiction
over the interstate transmission of power and wholesale power
sales.93 Finally, states retained jurisdiction over the local retail distribution of the power.94 The result was a regulatory “sandwich,” with
states having authority over the beginning and end of the electricity
life cycle and FERC obtaining jurisdiction over the middle.
This framework quickly ran into a technical problem. Electricity
travels by physics, not by contract. In 1945, the Supreme Court concluded that the line of federal jurisdiction “was to follow the flow of
electric energy, an engineering and scientific, rather than a legalistic
or governmental, test.”95 But because electricity flows do not follow
political (or contractual) borders, there is almost no way to determine
88. See Severin Borenstein & James Bushnell, Electricity Restructuring: Deregulation
or Reregulation?, 23 REG. 46, 47 (2000).
89. Amy W. Ando & Karen L. Palmer, Getting on the Map: The Political Economy of
State-Level Electricity Restructuring 8 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper 98-19-REV,
1998).
90. Federal Power Act, Pub. L. No. 74-334, 49 Stat. 863 (1935) (codified at 16
U.S.C. § 791).
91. See Borenstein & Bushnell, supra note 88, at 46 (“Analysis of the electricity
industry begins with the recognition that there are three rather distinct components of it:
generation, transmission, and distribution.”).
92. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012) (showing that with some exceptions, FERC “shall not
have jurisdiction . . . over facilities used for the generation of electric energy”).
93. Id. (conferring jurisdiction over “the transmission of electric energy in interstate
commerce and to the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce”); see also
id. § 824(d) (defining “ ‘sale of electric energy at wholesale’ ” as “a sale of electric energy to
any person for resale”).
94. Id. § 824(b)(1) (omitting FERC jurisdiction “over facilities used in local
distribution or only for the transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce, or over
facilities for the transmission of electric energy consumed wholly by the transmitter”).
95. Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 324 U.S. 515, 529 (1945).
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that a particular generator’s electrons will power a particular consumer’s home or business. Functionally, if there are any interstate
connections on the grid, it is at least plausible that some power
transactions will include the interstate transmission of power.96
Hence, FERC’s authority over wholesale electricity “in interstate
commerce” functionally became authority over any sale of power for
resale.
The upshot is that federal authority over electricity sales largely
rises and falls on the scope of the wholesale (sale-for-resale) market.97
In the context of vertically integrated monopolies, there were few
such sales—the monopoly generated its own power, transmitted it
across its own lines, and distributed it to its own consumers without
any intermediate sales. The federal role is minimal, and state commission authority is at its apex. In a competitive market, by contrast,
there will frequently be sales-for-resale (e.g., from an independent
generator to a utility which ultimately delivers the power to a consumer), and federal authority correspondingly grows.98
The unique attributes of this federal structure, combined with the
dominant political position of the local monopoly vis-à-vis the Commission, gave many state utility commissions ample incentive to oppose restructuring. On the one hand, incumbent utilities are by far
the dominant constituency of state utility commissions; if they opposed introducing competition, the very fact of the monopoly would
make it difficult for other voices to be heard.99 And on the other hand,
state utilities could fear restructuring simply for reasons of selfpreservation: “Since PUCs [Public Utilities Commissions] are in the
96. The Supreme Court’s decision in Fed. Power Comm’n v. Fla. Power & Light Co.,
404 U.S. 453 (1972), is illustrative. Due to Florida’s peninsular geography, the
concentration of customers at the southern end of the state, and the risk of hurricanes
disrupting the grid, Florida Power & Light was uniquely insulated from the remainder of
the American power grid. See id. at 456. It had no direct connections to any other state
electricity grids, though it did indirectly connect through several other Florida electric
utilities. See id. at 456-57. Nonetheless, the Court held that commingling at these indirect
connections was sufficient to support federal jurisdiction over the utility. Id. at 462-63.
97. The Federal Power Act also gives FERC jurisdiction over interstate transmission
of electricity. See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 6 (2002). Under a traditional monopoly
model, though, this authority was largely restricted to concerns over reliability rather than
pricing because transmission expenses were bundled into the overall cost of the electricity
purchase and did not constitute a separate transaction. See id. at 21. In a competitive
market where transmission is unbundled and charged separately from the actual provision
of the power, FERC has jurisdiction over the price of the transmission aspect of the
transaction, even at the retail level. See id.
98. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
99. See HIRSH, supra note 45, at 45; see also Terry M. Moe, The Politics of
Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT GOVERN? 267, 267 (John E.
Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989) (noting the strategy by reformers to create
institutions which are flawed by designed so as to stymie future attempts to undo the
reforms).
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business of regulating electric utilities, they might be reluctant to
push for a change that would diminish their role.”100 Indeed, the practical structure of many competition programs could easily combine
these concerns. Retail competition programs sometimes require that
utilities divest their generation assets and instead participate in the
wholesale market to acquire power. This both circumscribes the
business model of the utility and deprives the state utility commission of significant regulatory authority (since it shifts much of the
economic action to the interstate wholesale market, regulated by
FERC).101
Despite these barriers, several states began moving towards retail
competition in the mid-1990s. California launched a high-profile investigation into the feasibility of retail competition throughout the
1990s, prompting many states to follow suit.102 New Hampshire became the first to pass a restructuring law in May 1996; California’s
law followed later that year.103 As of 2010, over a dozen states (primarily but not exclusively in the Northeast) had allowed some form
of retail competition within their borders.104

100. HIRSH, supra note 45, at 55; see also Mayer N. Zald & Roberta Ash, Social
Movement Organizations: Growth, Decay and Change, 44 SOC. FORCES 327, 327 (1966)
(arguing that “participants in [social organization] structure have a stake in preserving the
organization, regardless of its ability to attain goals”).
101. See PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, 753 F.3d 467, 473 (4th Cir. 2014) (noting
that in Maryland, retail restructuring “divested utilities of their generation resources,
effectively compelling Maryland energy firms to participate in the federal wholesale
markets. . . . Maryland’s decision to participate in the federal scheme and enjoy its benefits
was necessarily accompanied by a relinquishment of the regulatory autonomy the state
had formerly enjoyed with respect to traditional utility monopolies”); see also New York,
535 U.S. at 21 (upholding FERC’s exercise of jurisdiction over the terms of unbundled
retail electricity transmission).
To be sure, not every state which underwent retail restructuring required
incumbents to divest their generation assets. See Walter R. Hall II et al., History,
Objectives, and Mechanics of Competitive Electricity Markets, in CAPTURING THE POWER OF
ELECTRIC RESTRUCTURING 1, 29 (Joey Lee Miranda ed., 2009) (“Several states mandated or
encouraged the former utility to fully or partially divest its generation and certain
companies chose to divest voluntarily, but most states and former integrated suppliers
have not taken this course and thus an integrated but functionally unbundled supplier
remains in most markets.”). Even so, it is evident that in a competitive environment it is
more likely that there will be sales-for-resale at some point in the process between the
electricity’s generation and ultimate consumption.
102. See HIRSH, supra note 45, at 248-54 (describing the CPUC’s “yellow book” and
“blue book” reports on retail electricity restructuring).
103. Id. at 259-60.
104. See Status of Electricity Restructuring by State, supra note 2. The precise number
of states with retail competition varies depending on how one counts states which have
only partially implemented retail competition or have suspended prior programs. Oregon,
for instance, allows competition for larger commercial and industrial consumers but not
residential customers. See OR. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, EVALUATION OF A COMPETITIVE
POWER
MARKET
FOR
RESIDENTIAL
CONSUMERS
1
(2002),
available
at
http://www.puc.state.or.us/meetings/pmemos/2002/120302/reg4att.pdf.
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But the move to competition stalled out with the 2000 California
energy crisis and Enron’s subsequent collapse.105 States which had
previously been contemplating restructuring—even some which had
taken significant steps in that direction—retreated due to concerns
about market volatility.106 In West Virginia, for example, the state
held a proceeding to consider restructuring in the late 1990s, and in
2000 the Public Service Commission recommended electricity restructuring.107 The West Virginia Legislature provided initial approval for this plan in March of 2000 but reserved full implementation pending certain tax statute modifications.108 When Enron imploded, the Legislature “opted not to modify the tax statutes upon
which [the] full implementation of the Restructuring Plan rested.
With the Restructuring Plan in a permanent state of limbo,” the
Commission abandoned restructuring in 2002.109
Of course, Enron is not the only reason why retail electric competition lost its momentum—it is one high profile example of failings
associated with the general bumps in overhauling a major American
business sector.110 And each state has a unique cocktail of policy considerations and industry circumstances which go into (or should go
into) the decision as to whether to restructure. Nonetheless, it is fair
to describe the California energy crisis and Enron’s subsequent collapse as a “critical event” in the public understanding of energy restructuring.111 Both Enron and California were central players in the
public’s understanding of free energy markets; their failures con105. See Richard D. Cudahy, Whither Deregulation: A Look at the Portents, 58 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 155, 180 (2001) (noting that California terminated its “dalliance” with
retail competition only a few months before Enron declared bankruptcy in 2001); Richard
J. Pierce, Jr., Completing the Process of Restructuring the Electricity Market, 40 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 451, 479 (2005) (“[T]he ‘just say no’ [to restructuring] group recognized that
the California debacle and the Enron scandal provided them an unprecedented opportunity
to . . . halt the restructuring process.”).
106. See Boyd, supra note 52, at 1668 (“Whereas in the years preceding the crisis
roughly half of the states had initiated restructuring, by the mid-2000s, in the wake of the
California crisis, many of these states had suspended or abandoned their efforts.”).
107. Allegheny Power, No. 05-0402-E-CN & 05-0750-E-PC, 2006 W. Va. PUC
LEXIS 1129, at *8 (W. Va. P.U.C. Apr. 7, 2006), available at http://www.psc.state.wv.us/
scripts/WebDocket/ViewDocument.cfm?CaseActivityID=185663.
108. Id. at *8-9.
109. Id. at *9.
110. See Joel B. Eisen, The Environmental Responsibility of the Regionalizing Electric
Utility Industry, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 295, 295-96 (2005) (“In my view and those
of numerous others, progress toward wholesale and retail markets (‘restructuring’) has
slowed through poor design of the regulatory and technical infrastructure and the
combination of California, Enron, the uncertain future of FERC’s Standard Market Design
(‘SMD’) and Wholesale Power Market Platform (‘WPMP’) proposals, states grappling with
‘stranded costs’ and other transition issues, and complex problems of market structure and
operation.”) (footnotes omitted).
111. See Meyer & Staggenborg, supra note 8, at 1638 (explaining the concept of “critical
events” as part of social movement practice).
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structed energy competition as unstable, unpredictable, and dangerous. Restructuring had sold itself on “the promise that ‘rates would
go down,’ ” and when presented with a high-profile case of exorbitant,
skyrocketing prices, consumers understandably grew mistrustful of
the enterprise.112 Opponents of restructuring certainly helped press
the issue, using these crises as proof positive that restructuring was
inherently flawed and that competitive electricity markets would always remain dysfunctional.113 While restructuring proponents contended that Enron was a case of illegal market manipulation rather
than a failure of competition as a concept, they were unable to gain
much traction.114
Whether or not it was fair to foist the sins of Enron onto the
broader restructuring debate is beside the point. Today the state of
retail competition has been characterized as “moribund.”115 Though
most of the states that initially restructured have not reverted to a
traditional monopoly model, the spread of retail choice has been
largely stymied.116
***
The preceding Section provided an abbreviated account of the rise,
fall, and partial recovery of the regulated-monopoly model of electricity production and distribution. It is not intended to be the full story,
nor is it intended to assert that social movement factors were the only factor driving the relevant changes. Rather, the social movement
account emphasizes certain features of the debate that are often unappreciated in explaining how regulatory structures change.
The successful implementation of the monopoly model relied significantly on the construction of a social understanding of the electricity sector as in accord with its consumers, with both parties enjoying a symbiotic relationship predicated on the expansion of cheap and
plentiful power. This generally harmonious relationship persisted
until the 1970s, when new developments created fissures. Some of
these developments (e.g., technological and demand plateaus) were
largely endogenous to the electricity market, but others (e.g., the rise
of the environmental movement and the growing trendiness of de112. See Spence, supra note 87, at 426-27, 446-47.
113. Id. at 417 (noting those who “see the California experience as proof that electricity
is a unique commodity ill suited to market-based pricing”).
114. See id. at 472, 477 (noting the “seemingly never-ending debate between those who
attributed the [California price] spike to market manipulation by firms like Enron and
those who attributed it instead to flaws in the design of the market” but that ultimately
“members of Congress . . . urged FERC to abandon its efforts to restructure the market”).
115. Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42 CONN. L.
REV. 1339, 1353 (2010).
116. See David B. Spence, The Political Barriers to a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV.
1451, 1455 & n.8 (2010).
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regulation) emerged from the outside. These forces allowed even inconspicuous changes to federal utility regulation to have large and
unexpected effects on the industry writ large. They also altered how
certain important stakeholders (most notably, FERC) perceived deregulation as both a technical possibility and an ideological good.
This shift caused the deregulation movement to make considerable strides through the 1990s, when the California energy crisis and
Enron’s collapse stalled their momentum. These critical events provided needed ammunition for opponents of restructuring to change
how the enterprise was framed in the public mind. Instead of a forward-thinking means for invigorating a moribund industry, energy
competition was reconstructed as dangerous and unreliable.
III. RENEWABLE ENERGY CREDITS
Renewable Energy Credits
are a joint product of generation and are separate from the actual
kWh of energy produced. They are measured in energy units such
as kWh and can be used to meet an electricity retailer’s portfolio
requirements in lieu of acquiring and selling at retail actual kWh
generated from eligible renewable resources.117

A Renewable Energy Credit typically represents a certain amount of
clean energy placed onto the grid.118 Because RECs and actual produced energy are distinct entities, they may be unbundled and sold
separately from one another.119 Once a REC is “used”—either to meet
legal clean energy portfolio requirements120 or to offset dirty energy
usage by end-use consumers121—it is generally retired and cannot
be reused.122

117. David Berry, The Market for Tradable Renewable Energy Credits, 42 ECOLOGICAL
ECON. 369, 370 (2002).
118. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-133.8(a)(6) (2014) (defining a REC as “a tradable
instrument that is equal to one megawatt hour of electricity or equivalent energy supplied
by a renewable energy facility, new renewable energy facility, or reduced by
implementation of an energy efficiency measure that is used to track and verify compliance
with the requirements of this section as determined by the Commission”).
119. Gillenwater, supra note 6, at 2109 (“RECs are unbundled environmental
commodity, and therefore may be sold separately, from the underlying electricity
generated.”).
120. See infra Part II.A.1.
121. See infra Part II.A.2.
122. See infra note 144 and accompanying text (noting the widespread rule against
double-counting RECs and the minority of states which permit the same REC to be used
for multiple purposes).
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Renewable Energy Credits are traded in two primary markets.123
The first is the “compliance” market. Many states require utilities to
source a specified percentage of their energy from renewable providers, and the purchase of RECs is one way utilities can meet these
statutory mandates. This marketplace is extensively regulated and
has been the subject of significant discussion in the literature. However, RECs can also be bought and sold on the “voluntary” market.
Even absent any legal requirement, some consumers may be willing
to pay a premium for clean energy.124 While it is virtually impossible
to discern whether the individual electrons that reach a particular
consumer are “clean” or “dirty,” RECs are a way of verifying that
clean energy equivalent to the consumer’s usage has been placed into
the pool of electricity.
Unlike the compliance market, the voluntary market is subject to
comparatively little regulation. Indeed, as will be discussed below,
the voluntary market rests in a somewhat unique position within the
broader sphere of electricity regulation.125 While addressing the compliance market as a point of comparison, this Section will focus on
the comparatively underexamined voluntary market and how it fits
into the joint federal-state energy regulatory structure.
A. Two REC Markets
1. The Compliance Market.
Many states have imposed Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS),
which require state utilities to obtain a specified percentage of the
electricity they sell from renewable sources.126 One way to meet these
requirements, of course, is for the utility to invest in its own renewable generation facilities.127 Typically, though not always, states permit utilities to purchase RECs to meet these requirements in lieu of
actually buying “clean” electricity themselves.128 This option may
123. See Crandall, supra note 6, at 896 (observing that RECs are “capable of being
purchased by consumers or applied to state energy portfolio requirements separately from
electricity”).
124. See id. at 906 (noting the “bragging rights” that may attach to such purchases).
125. See infra Part II.B.
126. NANCY RADER & SCOTT HEMPLING, THE RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARD: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE 1 (2001), available at http://www.naruc.org/Publications/rps.pdf (noting
that RPS requires that retail electricity sellers source “a certain amount of electricity from
renewable energy resources, such as wind, solar, geothermal, hydro, and various forms of
biomass and ocean energy”).
127. Felix Mormann, Enhancing the Investor Appeal of Renewable Energy, 42 ENVTL. L.
681, 692 (2012) (“[U]tilities that are subject to RPSs can invest in their own renewable
energy power generation facilities to earn RECs for the electricity they produce.”).
128. Delmas & Montes-Sancho, supra note 4, at 2274 (“The majority of states give their
electric utility providers the option of generating electricity from renewable resources

2015]

RENEWING ELECTRICITY COMPETITION

965

make sense if, for example, the utility’s normal energy sources are
insufficient to satisfy clean energy demand or the generators which
can most efficiently produce renewable energy cannot cheaply transmit the actual wattage to consumers.129 Because these REC sales are
made to satisfy state mandates, trading of this sort is known as the
REC “compliance” market.
The vast majority of writing on RECs focuses on their usefulness
for RPS compliance.130 RPS rules have been promoted as critical
measures to encourage the development of renewable generation
sources and to decrease the proportion of electricity sales which stem
from coal and other “dirty” resources. But RPS requirements are regulatory mandates imposed upon utilities, and so they are subject to
the same criticisms that can be leveled at any similar legal imposition. RECs, for their part, provide enhanced flexibility for utilities
charged with meeting RPS requirements, but “acquiring tradable
credits without generating the corresponding kWh locally does not
provide visible renewable energy generation resources for a community and thus might not be acceptable to energy consumers, especially those who would be willing to pay a premium for ‘green energy.’ ”131
RPS are creations of state law, and states have considerable latitude in determining the structure of REC trading, the types of energy
sources which “qualify” as renewable and thus can create RECs, and
other elements of the regulatory program.132 The preeminence of
state authority over the field has led to two primary problems. First,
states have naturally desired that RPS programs lead to enhanced
renewable resources in the vicinity of the state itself—it does Georgia
little good if its RPS subsidizes increased renewable generation in
Iowa.133 State efforts to favor the purchase of locally produced clean
themselves, and/or exchanging renewable energy credits (RECs) or renewable energy
certificates, in order to meet RPS mandates.”); see Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J.
Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch,
65 VAND. L. REV. 1801, 1810 & n.36 (2012) (listing the states where REC trading is
permitted, limited, or prohibited as a means of meeting RPS requirements).
129. See Berry, supra note 117, at 371.
130. See, e.g., Joshua P. Fershee, Changing Resources, Changing Market: The Impact of
a National Renewable Portfolio Standard on the U.S. Energy Industry, 29 ENERGY L.J. 49
(2008); Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, The Hidden Costs of State Renewable
Portfolio Standards (RPS), 15 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2007); Anne Havemann, Comment,
Surviving the Commerce Clause: How Maryland Can Square Its Renewable Energy Laws
with the Federal Constitution, 71 MD. L. REV. 848 (2012).
131. Berry, supra note 117, at 371.
132. See Am. Ref-Fuel Co., 105 FERC ¶ 61,004, 61,007 (2003) (concluding that because
RPS rules are creations of state law, it is up to state utility commissions to determine
whether generators or utilities own the RECs associated with power purchased under
PURPA).
133. See Kirsten H. Engel, The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based
Environmental Regulation: The Case of Electricity Deregulation, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 243,
268-78 (1999).
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energy (or RECs derived from such local sources) raise significant
dormant commerce clause issues.134 Second, because states can and
do have different definitions for what qualifies as a renewable resource, there are barriers to the interstate trade of RECs—a REC
which may validly apply against RPS requirements in Utah may not
do so in Colorado. This raises commerce clause issues of its own; it
has also prompted some commentators to press for a national RPS
standard.135
2. The Voluntary Market
The compliance market derives its force from state-imposed legal
requirements that give value to renewably generated electricity.
Even where there is no legal duty to act, however, some consumers
may wish to purchase green power on their own initiative. These
“voluntary” purchases of green energy are a rapidly increasing proportion of renewable electricity sales.136
One important area of distinction between the compliance and
voluntary markets is the primary purchaser of the RECs. The compliance market is dominated by utilities, because RPS mandates are
placed upon electricity retailers, not electricity consumers. Hence,
utilities purchase RECs from renewable energy generators or brokers—either bundled or unbundled from the electric power itself. The
consumers are not involved and, unless the utilities are permitted to
pass their potentially higher costs onward, may not even be affected.137 Along this axis, compliance REC trading is not materially different from the electricity market norm.
In the voluntary market, by contrast, the consumers are usually
the purchasers of the RECs. This places them in a relatively unique
position of having the ability to interact and deal directly with power
producers, or independent REC brokers, regardless of the regulated
134. See, e.g., Steven Ferrey, Threading the Constitutional Needle with Care: The
Commerce Clause Threat to the New Infrastructure of Renewable Power, 7 TEX. J. OIL
GAS & ENERGY L. 59 (2011); Daniel K. Lee & Timothy P. Duane, Putting the Dormant
Commerce Clause Back to Sleep: Adapting the Doctrine to Support State Renewable
Portfolio Standards, 43 ENVTL. L. 295 (2013); Nathan E. Endrud, Note, State Renewable
Portfolio Standards: Their Continued Validity and Relevance in Light of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, the Supremacy Clause, and Possible Federal Legislation, 45 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 259 (2008); Havemann, supra note 130. But see Engel, supra note 133, at 250
(arguing that state preferences for locally produced renewable energy should pass muster
under the Dormant Commerce Clause).
135. See, e.g., Davies, supra note 115, at 1341-44 (noting that more than 25 proposals
for a national RPS have been introduced in Congress).
136. See supra note 3.
137. See N.M. Indus. Energy Consumers v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm’n, 168 P.3d
105, 110 (N.M. 2007) (addressing a utility’s right to automatically recoup costs associated
with buying RECs in order to comply with a state RPS program).
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or deregulated structure of their state retail market. RECs are distinct in that they are an electricity “product” that is not tied to the
flow of electrons and thus can be bought and sold outside the electricity grid system.138 REC sales thus bypass the natural monopoly and
offer opportunities for buyers to interact with a multitude of potential
sellers even where electricity markets are not otherwise open for
competition.
Voluntary REC purchases come in three main varieties. In states
with electricity competition, consumers often may simply choose to
buy their electricity from companies that produce some or all of their
electricity from renewable sources.139 Even in monopoly states,
though, some states and utilities are offering “green pricing” plans,
wherein the utility offers consumers the option to pay a premium for
green power.140 Like in the compliance market, the utility then typically has a choice regarding whether it will directly source green energy or instead purchase an equivalent amount of RECs to cover the
consumer’s energy usage.141 Finally, there is an “unbundled” REC
market where consumers can purchase just the RECs without acquiring any corresponding electricity voltage.142
Because the voluntary market is decoupled from specific state
mandates, regulation of RECs trading on the voluntary market is
relatively minimal. In North Carolina, for instance, even the definition of a REC is restricted to those sold for purposes of complying
with the state’s RPS requirements.143 Indeed, the only regulation
North Carolina has put forward with respect to voluntary REC sales
is a requirement that a single REC not be “double-counted” for both
voluntary and compliance purposes.144 Michigan likewise appears to
138. Cf. Ferrey, supra note 134, at 63-64 (noting that RECs “are not subject to
geographic or physical limitation”).
139. HEETER ET AL., supra note 3, at 1.
140. See id.
141. Delmas & Montes-Sancho, supra note 4, at 2274.
142. HEETER ET AL., supra note 3, at 1.
143. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-133.8(a)(6) (2014) (defining a REC as “a tradable instrument
that is equal to one megawatt hour of electricity or equivalent energy supplied by a
renewable energy facility, new renewable energy facility, or reduced by implementation of
an energy efficiency measure that is used to track and verify compliance with the
requirements of this section as determined by the Commission”) (emphasis added); 4 N.C.
ADMIN. CODE 11 R08-66(b) (2014) (requiring the registration of any renewable energy
facility (inside and outside of North Carolina) which “intends for renewable energy
certificates it earns to be eligible for use by an electric power supplier to comply with [RPS
requirements]”) (emphasis added); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 460.1041(2) (2014) (“An
electric provider is responsible for demonstrating that a renewable energy credit used to
comply with a renewable energy credit standard is derived from a renewable energy source
and that the electric provider has not previously used or traded, sold, or otherwise
transferred the renewable energy credit.”) (emphasis added).
144. 4 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 11 R08-66(b)(4) (2014). This rule against double-counting is
common amongst state REC regulations and is generally accepted by REC market
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consider RECs to solely be a feature of the compliance market—it
states that a “renewable energy credit shall not be granted for renewable energy the renewable attributes of which are used by an
electric provider in a commission-approved voluntary renewable energy program.”145 The absence of consistent definitions poses particular problems in the voluntary market, however, as the relatively abstract nature of what a REC represents poses the potential for considerable consumer confusion and abuse.146
At its broadest, a REC is a “green jewel box” which encompasses
all positive environmental attributes of a given form of electricity
production.147 But defining RECs broadly creates considerable ambiguity regarding what RECs actually represent and whether they actually transfer a property right to specific emissions reductions.148 It
is of course very difficult to “dynamically score” the total environmental impact of any particular generation project. The more RECs are
said to represent, the harder these claims are to verify and the further they begin to stray from a quantifiable good that represents a
particular tradable attribute. Moreover, as the qualities of a “REC”
grow more abstract and less amenable to standardization, their usefulness as a tradable instrument diminishes. As Michael Gillenwater
puts it:
Environmental markets that operate with a clearly defined commodity are more likely to have low transaction costs and produce
public good benefits. Environmental commodities that lack clear
definitions will have higher transaction costs. And when traded in

participants. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 69-3-2004(7)(c) (2014) (“Renewable energy
credits sold through a voluntary service . . . may not be applied against a public utility's or
competitive electricity supplier’s obligation to meet the [renewable portfolio] standards.”);
CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARD ELIGIBILITY 86 (7th ed. 2013)
(“A REC shall be counted only once for compliance with the California [Renewables
Portfolio Standard] and may not be used to count toward the regulatory requirements of
any other state or to satisfy any other retail regulatory or voluntary market product
claims.”). Letter from Lawrence Silverstein, Senior Vice President & Managing Dir.,
NextEra Energy Power Mktg., LLC, to NEPOOL REC Sellers (May 15, 2014), available at
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1164899/vtspeedltrtonepoolrecsellers4-15-14.pdf
(“It is a fundamental principle of all renewable energy market sales that the
environmental characteristics associated with the electric energy generated cannot be
counted or claimed twice.”). It is not, however, universal. See Bird & Lokey, supra note 3,
at 21 (noting that Arizona, Vermont, and Wisconsin allow voluntary purchases to count
towards meeting RPS requirements and that several other states are silent on the subject).
145. MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 460.1039(1)(c) (2014).
146. See Crandall, supra note 6, at 947 (arguing that a uniform definition of a REC
“gives consumers more fluency in the market, allowing them to better choose between
competing options. This is uniquely imperative with environmental products, where
significant information asymmetries exist because of difficult-to-verify attributes, and
where health and safety command special attention”).
147. See Jaap Jansen, A Green Jewel Box?, ENVTL. FIN., March 2003, at 27, 27.
148. See Gillenwater, supra note 6, at 2112.
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separate markets, poorly defined commodities will more easily
come into conflict and cause confusion among market participants.149

RECs can also be given a narrow scope to refer only to the fact
that “(i) the underlying specific quantity of renewables-based electricity has been produced under the conditions specified by the standard
information on the certificate and (ii) that the certificate has not yet
been used for another application.”150 “Used” must be interpreted
broadly so as to not exploit consumer ignorance over renewable power transactions. The arrangement described in SZ Enterprises LLC v.
Iowa Utilities Board provides a striking example.151 There, a solar
energy company contracted with Dubuque, Iowa to construct a solar
facility which would “provide the city with renewable energy.”152 The
city would purchase the entire output of the solar facility, but the solar company would retain ownership of the RECs (with the stated
intention that they would sell them to other parties).153 The problem
with this proposal is that once the RECs are sold, it is misleading to
say that Dubuque is being provided with renewable energy.154
Though the RECs have not been “used” by Dubuque in a formal
sense—they were apparently not retired or used to satisfy RPS requirements—by representing to the city and its citizens that it was
providing them with renewable energy, Dubuque functionally used
its renewable attributes, and the solar company should not have been
allowed to reuse them for sale to other parties.
B. The Structure of REC Regulation
Despite encompassing a large portion of the overall REC marketplace, there is virtually no case law or regulation discussing issues
specific to voluntary REC transactions. As of the writing of this Article, no case has addressed matters related to voluntary REC transactions specifically, and only a scattered few have addressed general
issues related to REC transactions outside the compliance market
context.155 This is a troubling omission, because the unique attributes
149. Michael Gillenwater, Redefining RECs—Part 2: Untangling Certificates and
Emission Markets, 36 ENERGY POL’Y 2120, 2120 (2008).
150. Jansen, supra note 147, at 27.
151. 850 N.W.2d 441 (Iowa 2014).
152. Id. at 444.
153. See id. at 444-45 (noting that the city would get one-third of any revenues
associated with REC sales).
154. See 16 C.F.R. § 260.15(d) (2014) (“If a marketer generates renewable electricity
but sells renewable energy certificates for all of that electricity, it would be deceptive for
the marketer to represent, directly or by implication, that it uses renewable energy.”).
155. The closest examples are decisions regarding which entity—generator or
purchasing utility—owns RECs generated under PURPA contracts. See, e.g., Wheelabrator
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of the REC market make it difficult to locate inside our system of
electricity federalism.
The division of authority between the federal government and the
states in the electricity context, formalized in the Federal Power
Act,156 initially grew out of the Supreme Court’s 1927 decision in Public Utilities Commission of Rhode Island v. Attleboro Steam & Electricity.157 Attleboro Steam & Electricity, a Massachusetts company,
contracted to buy electricity produced by a Rhode Island generator.158
The Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission attempted to assert
authority to regulate the rates of the contract.159 The Supreme Court
concluded, however, that this would place a “direct burden upon interstate commerce” in violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause.160
The Court specifically held that neither Rhode Island nor Massachusetts could regulate the transaction, but rather “if such regulation is
required it can only be attained by the exercise of the power vested in
Congress.”161 Since Congress had to this point not enacted any comprehensive statutes enabling electricity regulation,162 the Federal
Power Act was passed in attempt to bridge the “Attleboro gap.”
Despite considerable churn in the development and regulation of
the electricity industry, the Federal Power Act’s division of state and
national responsibility has proved remarkably durable. The entire
structure, however, is based on the nature of how power is physically
delivered from generator to consumer. RECs, which are an “electricity” product entirely divorced from the actual physical channels of
power distribution, do not have a clear place inside this framework.
This makes the scope of state and federal authority over them quite
unclear. Since they are primarily associated with either state-created
RPS programs or end-user (retail) purchases, the federal government
has displayed limited interest in regulating RECs from an electricity
perspective (though the FTC has taken some steps to regulate them
Lisbon, Inc. v. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control, 531 F.3d 183, 186 (2d Cir. 2008);
Morgantown Energy Assocs. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, No. 2:12-cv-6327, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 140220, at *2 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 30, 2013); ARIPPA v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 966
A.2d 1204, 1212-13 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009). FERC has decided that this question is not
governed by PURPA but is one of state law. See Am. Ref-Fuel Co., 105 FERC ¶ 61,004
(2003).
156. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
157. 273 U.S. 83 (1927).
158. Id. at 84.
159. See id. at 84-86.
160. Id. at 89-90.
161. Id. at 90.
162. The first federal statute dealing with electricity regulation, the Federal Water
Power Act, was passed in 1920 but had a relatively narrow scope focusing on hydroelectric
power. The law was superseded by the Federal Power Act. See Sharon Jacobs, Bypassing
Federalism and the Administrative Law of Negawatts, 100 IOWA L. REV. 885, 892 (2015).
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from a consumer protection standard). However, shorn from the Federal Power Act’s delineation of regulatory responsibility, state regulation of voluntary RECs may run into significant dormant commerce
clause problems. This lacuna may insulate voluntary REC sales from
protectionist state utility commissions, making them an ideal point of
entry for electricity market participants who seek to get a “foot in the
door” in otherwise closed marketplaces.163
1. The Federal Role
As Jim Rossi and Thomas Hutton observe, energy and environmental law have historically diverged in the degree of national uniformity typically demanded by the relevant statutory schema.164 In
the environmental context, federal law typically sets a “floor” which
all states must meet but then permits individual states to impose
more stringent requirements or other policy innovations that exceed
the national standard.165 By contrast, in the electric power context,
“industry enjoys a national standard and need not tailor its activities
to suit numerous regulators across smaller or more regional markets.”166 This is not entirely true, obviously, as individual states are
vested with the authority to regulate the retail distribution of power
and their decisions regarding how to structure the retail market vary
considerably.167 Rather, their core observation is that where Congress
has crafted federal regulations regarding electric power, it is assumed that those regulations are meant to unify the entire field of
regulation on that subject.168
Clean energy programs lie at the interstices of these two fields.
And REC sales present a particularly unique problem. There is currently little basis in federal law to regulate RECs at all (excepting
generally applicable consumer protection standards).169 Despite the
interstate character of the market, FERC only has a limited role in
regulating RECs. Recall that the Federal Power Act gives FERC authority to regulate “the transmission of electric energy in interstate
commerce” and “the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate
commerce.”170 REC sales are neither, at least where the RECs are
163. See infra Part III.
164. See Jim Rossi & Thomas Hutton, Federal Preemption and Clean Energy Floors, 91
N.C. L. REV. 1283 (2013).
165. See id. at 1289-90.
166. Id. at 1291.
167. See supra Part I.B.
168. See Rossi & Hutton, supra note 164, at 1303-04.
169. See Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 16 C.F.R. pt. 260
(2014). Another exception is where the RECs are bundled with wholesale power
transactions. See infra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
170. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2014).
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unbundled from the sale of electric energy.171 Nor were REC sales
necessarily contemplated as part of the transactions regulated by
PURPA. In 2003, FERC explicitly held that the contracts it approved
for electricity purchases from Qualifying Facilities (QFs) did not address, one way or another, who held title to RECs and that such decisions were a matter of state law.172 FERC confirmed this judgment in
2012, stating that “a REC does not constitute the transmission of
electric energy in interstate commerce or the sale of electric energy at
wholesale in interstate commerce. Therefore, RECs and contracts for
the sale of RECs are not themselves jurisdictional facilities subject to
the Commission’s jurisdiction under” the Federal Power Act.173 The
sole exception was if the RECs were bundled with the sale of electric
power. In such circumstances, the Commission held that REC sales
could affect the rates of the interstate power transaction and thus fell
under the Commission’s authority.174
Beyond FERC, it is likely that the FTC could exercise limited authority to regulate voluntary REC sales to the extent that there is a
“widespread pattern of unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”175 FTC
regulations could curb some of the more flagrant labeling problems
associated with RECs, enhancing the transparency of REC sales.176
For example, several environmentalists recently petitioned the FTC
to investigate a Vermont power company which reportedly was marketing power sold to consumers as “renewable” while selling the associated RECs to New England utilities for RPS compliance purposes.177 The petition remains under review; interestingly, the power
company has argued that it is not subject to FTC jurisdiction at all
because Vermont’s status as a monopoly state necessarily means the
company is not “marketing” its products to consumers (who lack the
ability to choose an alternative provider).178

171. See WSPP Inc., 139 FERC ¶ 61,061 (2012) (concluding that unbundled REC sales
are outside of FERC’s jurisdiction but that REC sales bundled with electric energy are
FERC jurisdictional).
172. Am. Ref-Fuel Co., 105 FERC ¶ 61,004 (2003).
173. WSPP Inc., 139 FERC ¶ 61,061 (2012).
174. Id.
175. See 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b)(3)(B) (2014).
176. See Crandall, supra note 6, at 947-50 (articulating potential bases for FTC
authority).
177. Petition to Investigate Deceptive Trade Practices of Green Mountain Power Co.
in the Marketing of Renewable Energy to Vermont Consumers at 1 (Sept. 15, 2014),
available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/624571/
140915gmpvermontlawpetition.pdf.
178. Id. at 18-19 (quoting Letter from Douglas Smith, Dir. of Power Supply,
Green Mountain Power Co., to Susan Hudson, Clerk, Vt. Pub. Serv. Bd. (Dec. 20, 2012)),
available
at
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/624571/
140915gmpvermontlawpetition.pdf.
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It seems unlikely that the FTC will agree that it lacks jurisdiction
over allegedly misleading claims by monopoly electricity providers to
their customers. But regardless, the FTC neither has the institutional capacity nor (in all likelihood) the desire to issue regulations designed to affect the substantive nature of the retail or wholesale electricity market.179 To the extent that it chooses to intervene in REC
markets, it is likely to do so in an extremely narrow fashion focusing
on deceptive or misleading claims, rather than engaging in wholesale
regulation of voluntary REC markets. And where any regulation or
guidance does approach broader issues relating to electricity market
regulations, it will likely be highly deferential to FERC—an agency
that has been considerably more supportive of electricity competition
than many of its state-level peers.180
2. The State Role
Because voluntary REC sales are most closely associated with the
retail market, states have some authority to regulate voluntary REC
sales—though this authority is largely untested. Outside the general
state law contract principles which would apply to any transaction
for RECs,181 states have the clear ability to regulate when addressing
the domestic intersection of the voluntary and compliance markets.
FERC has already decreed that RECs—at least when used in the
compliance context—are creations of state law and thus generally
subject to state jurisdiction.182 Even states with minimal regulation of
voluntary REC trades usually have policies forbidding the “doublecounting” of RECs for both compliance and voluntary purposes.183
“Green pricing” programs run by the incumbent monopoly utilities
also are an easy target for state regulation, as these utilities’ services
are already under the pervasive oversight of state commissions.184
179. Federal enforcement of green guidelines has been markedly inconsistent across
administrations. See Perrin Cooke, Note, Green Guide Gaps: Expanding FTC Authority
over Low-Carbon Marketing Claims, 39 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 105, 125-27 (2014) (noting the
complete drop-off in FTC enforcement actions against misleading green claims during the
Bush administration and their revival under the Obama administration).
180. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 74, at 1367 (noting that FERC was historically
one of the great champions of electricity market restructuring).
181. See, e.g., Colo. & Santa Fe Energy Co. v. Nexant, Inc., No. C 12-00011 JSW, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137514, at *7-10 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2012) (applying California law to a
suit alleging breach of contract where a REC buyer allegedly refused delivery under a
contract for sale); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Ninth Judicial Dist. Court, 329 P.3d 1264,
1271 (Mont. 2014) (applying general contract and state law principles to conclude that a
mandatory forum-selection clause contained in a REC sale contract required that the
dispute be litigated in California).
182. See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 69-8-210(2) (2014) (“[A] public utility shall offer its
customers the option of purchasing a product composed of or supporting power from
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But states are limited in their regulatory authority as well. The
Dormant Commerce Clause places sharp limitations on the ability of
a state to provide explicit or implicit preferences for products produced within its own borders.185 Most obviously, states can only in the
rarest of circumstances explicitly discriminate against out-of-state
commercial actors.186 A state-created private monopoly presumptively
runs afoul of this restriction, as the functional effect is to restrict
commercial activity to one (in-state) firm to the exclusion of all others
(including all out-of-state competition).187 Unless permitted by Congress,188 “[s]tate and local governments may not use their regulatory
power to favor local enterprise by prohibiting patronage of out-ofstate competitors or their facilities.”189
For similar reasons, a state may not mandate that some or all of a
given product be purchased from in-state providers. In Wyoming v.
Oklahoma, the Supreme Court invalidated an Oklahoma statute
which demanded that ten percent of the coal used by state utilities
derive from Oklahoma sources.190 The same logic would almost certainly prevent a state from prohibiting or disincentivizing the use of
RECs generated from out-of-state providers from being used to meet
RPS requirements, let alone bar their purchase on the voluntary
market.191
Between those poles lie some thorny, and largely uncharted, regulatory questions. RECs can only be created when electricity is genercertified environmentally preferred resources that include but are not limited to wind,
solar, geothermal, and biomass, subject to review and approval by the commission. The
commission shall ensure that these resources have been certified as meeting industryaccepted standards.”).
185. These limitations are default rules, but Congress can always authorize a state to
engage in regulation that would otherwise violate the Dormant Commerce Clause. See
W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 652-53 (1981) (“If Congress
ordains that the States may freely regulate an aspect of interstate commerce, any action
taken by a State within the scope of the congressional authorization is rendered
invulnerable to Commerce Clause challenge.”).
186. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) (“[O]nce a state law is shown to
discriminate against interstate commerce either on its face or in practical effect, the
burden falls on the State to demonstrate both that the statute serves a legitimate local
purpose, and that this purpose could not be served as well by available nondiscriminatory
means.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
187. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 394-95 (1994). But
see United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 34142 (2007) (distinguishing Carbone where the monopoly was granted to a public entity).
188. See supra note 185. State authority to establish retail electricity monopolies can
be implicitly found in the Federal Power Act. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
189. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 394.
190. 502 U.S. 437, 440, 455 (1992).
191. See Eisen, supra note 110, at 308 (“In fact, a state cannot allow only power
generated and sold within the state by in-state utilities to counts [sic] toward the
renewables requirement. If it did so the RPS would clearly run afoul of the dormant
commerce clause.”).
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ated. A regulation of RECs necessarily regulates electricity generation as well. Where a REC emerges from electricity generated out-ofstate, state regulation borders precipitously on impermissible, extraterritorial lawmaking, in violation of the Dormant Commerce
Clause.192 A generation project located in state A, whose power is sold
entirely to state B, would have to meet the requirements of state C if
even a portion of any associated RECs were placed into that market.
National Solid Wastes Management Association v. Meyer is instructive.193 There, Wisconsin prohibited use of Wisconsin landfills
unless the waste was generated in a region that had an “effective recycling program” (as defined in the Wisconsin statute).194 The Seventh Circuit struck down the law:
Wisconsin’s solid waste legislation conditions the use of Wisconsin
landfills by non-Wisconsin waste generators on their home communities’ adoption and enforcement of Wisconsin recycling standards; all persons in that non-Wisconsin community must adhere to
the Wisconsin standards whether or not they dump their waste in
Wisconsin. . . . As a price for access to the Wisconsin market, it attempts to assume control of the integrity of the product that is
moving in interstate commerce. Wisconsin’s approach to sound solid waste management, and no one else’s, must govern, even when
the product will never cross its borders.195

By contrast, in Energy & Environment Legal Institute v. Epel the
District of Colorado upheld a state RPS program against claims that
it required out-of-state producers to generate electricity in accordance with Colorado’s definition of “renewable” power.196 The court
concluded that an RPS requirement does not impose any requirements whatsoever on out-of-state electricity generators—Colorado
utilities can “buy and sell electricity from any in-state or out-of-state
generator. The [RPS] does not limit these transactions, set minimum
standards for out-of-state generators that wish to do business in Colorado, or attempt to control pricing of the electricity.”197 Nor does the
RPS mandate have any effect on wholly out-of-state transactions—a
sale from a Wyoming generator to a South Dakota utility, for in-

192. See, e.g., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573,
582-83 (1986) (holding that laws which, in “practical effect,” regulate out-of-state
transactions are unconstitutional under the Dormant Commerce Clause (citing S. Pac. Co.
v. Ariz. ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 775 (1945))).
193. See Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n v. Meyer, 63 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 1995).
194. Id. at 653.
195. Id. at 658, 661.
196. Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, No. 11-cv-00859-WJM-BNB, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 64285, at *19 (D. Colo. May 9, 2014).
197. Id. at *20-21.
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stance.198 The only time the RPS program comes into play is if the
out-of-state generators wished for their energy to count towards Colorado’s RPS mandate.199
Epel suggests that the Dormant Commerce Clause is not implicated so long as foreign power generators can access the REC market on
equal terms compared to in-state (Colorado) peers. This has very different implications in the context of the voluntary REC market compared to the compliance market Epel addressed. Consider the question of whether RECs can be sold “unbundled” from corresponding
power sales. While most states permit unbundled RECs to count towards meeting RPS goals, some require that the power and RECs be
sold together.200 The compliance RPS market exists at the wholesale
level—the power at issue is being sold to utilities for resale to consumers—and so there is opportunity for various players (including
out-of-state firms) to participate in providing RPS-eligible renewable
power even if the local commission imposes a bundling requirement.
But the voluntary market occurs at the retail level—a bundling requirement there would take the utilities’ sanctioned monopoly over
retail sale of power and bootstrap it onto the REC market as well. As
neither the Federal Power Act nor any other statute gives state regulators the authority to circumvent the Dormant Commerce Clause
where REC sales are concerned, this would seem to run afoul of constitutional strictures.201
Because states have yet to extensively regulate voluntary REC
sales and there have been no reported cases concerning the subject,
assessing how these questions will ultimately be answered is at best
speculative. Still, certain predictions can be made. States probably
can impose general standards of conduct upon voluntary REC sales,
including requirements of transparency, enumeration of specific fuels
considered to be or not be “renewable” in character, and other like
concerns. These requirements would have to be universal, however;
they could not discriminate against out-of-state REC providers. Nor,
in all likelihood, could states simply grant the exclusive right to sell
RECs to a single provider (most likely, the incumbent monopoly). In
essence, while states retain considerable regulatory authority over
the voluntary REC market, their powers—and their ability to block
competition outright—are not nearly as expansive as they are in the
retail electricity sector generally.
198. Id. at *19-20.
199. Id. at *21.
200. See supra note 128; see also, e.g., N.M. Indus. Energy Consumers v. N.M. Pub.
Regulation Comm’n, No. 33,244, 2012 N.M. Unpub. LEXIS 2, at *3-5 (N.M. June 7, 2012)
(declining, on mootness grounds, to review a New Mexico Commission ruling which
rejected an RPS compliance plan that incorporated unbundled RECs).
201. See supra notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
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IV. THE FOOT IN THE DOOR: VOLUNTARY REC SALES AND ELECTRICITY
COMPETITION
Even though the call for retail electricity competition has died
down, it is unlikely that the cause of electricity choice has been
abandoned for good. On the one hand, “traditional regulation . . . will
remain vulnerable to opportunistic attacks from organized groups,
e.g., large industrials, independent producers, and even some utilities, or political entrepreneurs who stand to reap large gains from a
change in the status quo.”202 On the other hand, incumbent interests—often with the support of friendly state regulators—will continue to fight vigorously to maintain their privileged position in the
status quo.203 The outcome of such battles will likely depend on the
relative strength of the political and economic interests that can be
brought to bear against the relevant regulatory authorities.
Proponents of electricity restructuring have already created an
umbrella lobbying group known as the COMPETE Coalition, consisting of “781 electricity stakeholders, including customers, suppliers,
traditional and clean energy generators, transmission owners, trade
associations, technology innovators, environmental organizations and
economic development corporations.”204 This organization, whose
membership ranges from Sempra Energy (parent of San Diego Gas &
Electric) to the Wendy’s/Arby’s Group,205 helps organize diverse entities within the electricity marketplace in support of “well-structured
competitive electricity markets.”206 While organizations like
COMPETE will no doubt be relevant to crafting and implementing a
broad-based strategy in pursuit of restructuring, this Part does not
focus on such traditional lobbying forms. Rather, in keeping with the
analysis in Part I, it focuses on how the seemingly mundane decision
to enter into the voluntary REC market could itself open opportunities in a manner similar to more traditional social movement
advocacy.
The prior Sections demonstrate two important features about the
voluntary REC market pertinent to its impact on retail restructuring
debates. First, it is a unique transaction in the electricity context be202. John S. Moot, Economic Theories of Regulation and Electricity Restructuring, 25
ENERGY L.J. 273, 303 (2004).
203. See Pierce, supra note 105, at 491-92 (arguing that the “just say no” utilities and
their allied state utility commissions will continue to oppose retail competition for the
foreseeable future); see also supra notes 86-101 and accompanying text (noting the various
forces blocking retail electricity restructuring).
204. About
COMPETE:
Competition
in
Electricity
Markets,
COMPETE,
http://www.competecoalition.com/about (last visited Apr. 4, 2015).
205. COMPETE Coalition Members, COMPETE,
http://www.competecoalition.com/
members (last visited Apr. 4, 2015).
206. About COMPETE, supra note 204.
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cause it bypasses the natural monopoly created by the wires and thus
enables direct contact between retail consumers and multiple market
participants, even where restructuring has not occurred. Second,
states are limited in their ability to limit competition in this area—at
least compared to their expansive authority to create and maintain a
monopoly in the retail electricity sector more broadly.
These characteristics of the voluntary REC market share important characteristics with prior market developments which have
helped spur energy competition and overcome resistance from incumbent monopolies. Although RECs are not themselves a dominant
part of the retail electricity market, their relatively unregulated nature gives new market entrants a toehold in markets that otherwise
are entirely closed off to competition.207 From humble beginnings,
these external players can gather customers, lobby legislators and
administrative agencies, and effectively present themselves as genuine, lower-cost alternatives to the incumbent monopolies.
To be sure, this is not an inevitability. There are several reasons
to refrain from overstating the pro-competitive effects of voluntary
REC transactions. The connection between REC sales and retail electricity service is more attenuated than, say, the connection between
small generator competition authorized by PURPA and generation
markets more broadly. Moreover, observing that states have comparatively less authority over voluntary RECs is not to say they have
none—a sufficiently aggressive state regulatory commission could
still find creative ways to intervene in favor of the incumbent monopoly and against novel market entrants.
Yet the strategy of using RECs as a foot in the door to promote
wider reform effort retains appeal. The literature on law and social
movements offers a fruitful way of understanding how a seemingly
minor alteration in the economic structure of electricity markets
might have significant impacts on a related, yet clearly distinct, policy debate. Voluntary RECs offer a chance for additional electricity
market participants to gain influence in new states and territories,
directly engage with potential customers and recruit them as allies in
broader political campaigns, and create the space for partial reforms
which may, over time, grease the path down toward larger electricity
reform initiatives.

207. See Ingo Vogelsang, Network Utilities in the U.S. – Sector Reforms Without
Privatization 24 (CESifo, Working Paper No. 1142, 2004), available at
https://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/publications/working-papers/CESifoWP/CESifoWPdetails?
wp_num=1142&CESifoWP.search=+ (“Liberalization almost invariably started with
entrepreneurs who tried to overcome regulatory entry barriers. Under the multifaceted
U.S. regulatory system they were able to get a foot in the door and offer services in some
restricted geographic or product space.”).
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Conceptualizing the business decision to enter the voluntary REC
market in social movement terms reveals how this maneuver could
alter the playing field and reinvigorate the case for electricity restructuring. The presumed natural monopoly of utilities seemed to
make retail competition impossible; even once experience with
wholesale wheeling illuminated a theoretical path to retail restructuring, after an initial burst of success, advocates of restructuring
have found no way to alter the political dynamics in states that continue to adhere to the old monopoly model. The development of a voluntary REC market—an electricity “product” that can be sold directly to consumers regardless of the overall state of the retail electricity
market—reshuffles the deck and provides new opportunities for
market penetration.
In short, voluntary RECs matter to advocates of retail restructuring, but not because they represent some massive new economic opportunity or require regulatory interpretations that demand retail
competition as well. Their impacts are more subtle, relating to how
advocates for restructuring can alter their position in the communities they wish to influence. Such seemingly minor changes can cast a
large shadow when attempting to tackle longstanding incumbent
monopolies and the agencies which are responsible for creating the
pertinent regulatory climate. Surveying efforts by reformers to alter
entrenched but (arguably) inefficient political systems, Eric Patashnik identifies three key conditions for successful social change: First,
reformers must alter the procedural context used to make decisions,
as the defaults typically favor incumbents; second, they must raise
awareness amongst unengaged citizens; and third, they must often
make tactical concessions to their opposition to enable a viable reform coalition to emerge.208 As will be demonstrated in the final Section, voluntary REC sales carry with them the potential to enable
each of these conditions.
A. Persuading Policymakers and Altering Decisional Defaults
Advocates of retail restructuring in a monopoly state suffer from a
chicken-and-egg problem—they must gain a foothold in a state in order to have any hope of influencing policymakers and regulators who
already have strong connections to incumbent monopolies; but that
very monopoly status under debate prevents them from gaining any
leverage within the state. Voluntary REC sales offer an opportunity
to shift the political calculus in locations where the influence of monopoly providers has been relatively uncontested. In essence, the voluntary REC market alters the procedural order of the retail electrici208. PATASHNIK, supra note 30, at 19-22.
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ty debate by moving the initial decision—can there be competition at
all—out of the hands of the regulatory body.209 Generators, power
marketers, and other market participants which have no way of
reaching consumers in regulated environments can easily participate
in the REC market without running afoul of the incumbent’s exclusive monopoly franchise. In other words, the voluntary REC market
changes the political and economic posture of the entities seeking retail competition—instead of being pure outsiders with no connection
with or constituency within the target state, they can come to regulators and policymakers with a list of consumers and potential base of
support already in place.210
Of course, the voluntary REC market does not itself demand that
these proposals come to fruition. Signing up a voluntary REC customer does not, for example, grant the company any retail authority,
nor is such authority necessary for REC markets to function properly. This is rather a story about altering the political and regulatory
landscape.211 Voluntary REC sales provide a foot in the door for additional participants beyond the monopoly providers to gain leverage
and influence as economic and political players in hitherto monopoly
regions.
Eugene Volokh’s notion of a “political power slippery slope” is a
useful analogue.212 He provides the example of a hypothetical Supreme Court decision permitting the sale of marijuana while also allowing Congress to ban its advertisement.213 On its face, this decision
would allow Congress to decriminalize marijuana without worrying
that such an enactment would necessarily lead to the advertisement
of the drug.214 But practically speaking, the legalization of marijuana
will create a multi-billion dollar industry with a strong incentive to
209. See Paul Pierson, Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political
Processes, 14 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 72, 73-74 (2000) (outlining the importance of sequencing
in determining political outcomes).
210. See PATASHNIK, supra note 30, at 28 (noting that while political scientists often
“focus on durable changes in formal authority. . . . [T]he uncoordinated and often
unpredictable choices of producers and millions of consumers arguably often have a greater
influence over social outcomes in many policy sectors than do elected officials, lobbyists, or
voters.”).
211. Much has been written about “policy feedback”—the idea that “policies may
themselves reshape the political environment.” Suzanne Mettler & Joe Soss, The
Consequences of Public Policy for Democratic Citizenship: Bridging Policy Studies and
Mass Politics, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 55, 60 (2004); see also PATASHNIK, supra note 30, at 29.
This argument differs slightly in that it posits how an emergent market opportunity might
alter the political environment of a related but distinct business sector.
212. Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026,
1114-20 (2003).
213. Id. at 1114.
214. See id. (“Now Congress can enact a law that allows marijuana sales but not
advertising (decision A) without fear that the Court will hold that marijuana advertising
must also be legal (result B).”).
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overturn the advertising ban as well.215 In effect, the law creates a
new powerful interest group which—although not guaranteed to prevail in Congress or the court of public opinion—certainly is better
positioned to advance its interests than it was prior to the initial
decision.
A similar story can be told regarding the introduction of competition into the long-distance telephone services market. For many
years a sector monopolized by the Bell system, the initial crack of
competition came when the FCC allowed other companies to offer
“private line” services.216 At the time, the FCC did not view this as a
dramatic step—one commissioner characterized it as providing “a
little salt and pepper of competition to” the general rule of regulatory
protection.217 But the direct-line firms had no interest in staying confined inside their box and quickly moved to expand into the general
long-distance telephone markets.218 Though initially resistant, the
FCC proved unable to maintain its opposition for long, “and the rest,
as they say, is history.”219
As the preceding Section demonstrated, the voluntary REC market lacks the economic and regulatory characteristics that give state
regulatory commissions authority to block retail electricity competition.220 It is not a natural monopoly, and neither the Federal Power
Act nor any other statute enables states to circumvent the Dormant
Commerce Clause and enact protective legislation favoring local utilities. These characteristics provide a safe harbor for competition, but
only a limited one—the ability to sell RECs freely does nothing to alter the plenary authority state commissions possess over retail
wheeling. However, just as in Volokh’s example where the hypothetical court decision only guaranteed the ability to sell marijuana, not
the right to advertise it, the ability to engage in voluntary REC sales
creates new stakeholders who in turn can accumulate political capital for the pursuit of additional reforms.
215. See id. at 1114-15.
216. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 74, at 1342-43 (discussing Applications of
Microwave Commc’ns, Inc. for Constr. Permits, 18 F.C.C.2d 953 (1969) and Establishment
of Policies & Procedures for Consideration of Application to Provide Specialized Common
Carrier Servs. in the Domestic Pub. Point-to-Point Microwave Radio Serv., 29 F.C.C.2d 870
(1971)).
217. Jim Chen, The Legal Process and Political Economy of Telecommunications
Reform, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 835, 845 (1997) (quoting Comm’r Nicolas Johnson).
218. See id. (observing that the direct-line decision “sparked a conflagration that the
FCC could not contain”); Kearney & Merrill, supra note 74, at 1343 (“But competition could
not be easily confined to private-line services.”).
219. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 74, at 1343; see MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 561
F.2d 365, 380-81 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (overturning an FCC decision rejecting direct competition
by MCI against AT&T in the long-distance telephone market).
220. See supra Part II.B.
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This avenue—relatively small nods toward competition creating
momentum towards further liberalization by increasing the power of
alternative stakeholders—has long been a feature of the energy market. PURPA provides one template. There was no inherent reason
why enabling a narrow class of small generators to hook into the grid
would necessarily lead to widespread competition within the energy
generation sector. But PURPA revealed both a hunger for new generation options and, perhaps more importantly, created a constituency which could effectively press for still greater liberalization
efforts.221
More recently, the renewable energy sector has also used its foothold in state politics to successfully combat dominant energy players
in the fight over climate change legislation. The 2010 defeat of California’s Proposition 23—which would have effectively repealed California’s carbon dioxide emissions regulations—is illustrative.222 As
Eric Biber observes, 2010 was generally not a good year for supporters of environmental causes, in the energy sector or otherwise.223
What made California different? Unlike many states, California has
long aggressively promoted renewable energy and the renewable energy industry, creating a strong domestic political counterweight to
traditional energy interests.224 Moreover, even companies that had
deep ties to “dirty” energy production in California had also invested
in greening technology and initiatives—sometimes to comply with
state RPS mandates, sometimes to access new market opportunities
spurred by their greener competitors.225 Together, these factors increased the political leverage environmental proponents had within
California and neutered some opposition that might have otherwise
been expected from large energy interests.
The REC market offers a similar opening for competitive forces to
gain a foothold amongst retail consumers and better position themselves to influence the regulatory and legislative agenda. The history
221. See Vogelsang, supra note 207, at 24 (“Eventually, and with the help of new
entrants and customer groups envisaging benefits they were able to convince regulators,
courts and legislators about the benefits of liberalization.”).
222. See Eric Biber, Cultivating a Green Political Landscape: Lessons for Climate
Change Policy from the Defeat of California’s Proposition 23, 66 VAND. L. REV. 399, 403-04
(2013).
223. See id. at 400 (noting that at the federal level, any hopes of comprehensive climate
change legislation were dashed by the landslide victory of conservative Republicans into
the House).
224. See id. at 401 (“California is different in significant part because of history,
specifically the long history of its aggressive efforts to develop energy policy that increases
efficiency and reduces dependence on fossil fuels. Those policies have, over the years,
created an interest group landscape that is supportive of stricter efforts to restrict carbon
emissions and hostile to efforts to repeal energy efficiency and renewable energy
mandates—as shown by the details of the campaign over Proposition 23.”).
225. See id. at 420-25.
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of electricity competition is intricately tied up in the environmental
and renewable energy movement. As noted above, the first step in
electricity restructuring came in the form of PURPA—a statute designed to promote the generation of renewable, environmentally sustainable energy.226 Retail electricity restructuring was similarly promoted as serving environmental goals—most notably, by giving consumers the chance to choose partial or total green power options
above and beyond what incumbent utilities were offering.227 Surveys
indicated that large majorities were willing to pay at least slightly
more money to have renewable power.228 Where the market for voluntary RECs exists, a market for green power choice likely exists alongside of it.
B. Gaining New Consumers (and Constituents)
Voluntary REC market participants can also leverage their contacts with their customers to promote support for restructuring by
the consumers themselves. While the prior Section focused on the
influence wielded by the REC sellers themselves, this Section emphasizes how REC consumers can be mobilized to counter the power
of utility companies in front of utility commissions. Regulators “are
responsive not only to the fixed preferences of well-informed voters,
but also to the potential preferences of constituents who could become
active and attentive if provoked.”229 Voluntary REC sales can help
render coherent and salient a previously diffuse and disorganized
consumer base which might favor restructuring.
Voluntary REC sales offer a particularly attractive opportunity for
gaining consumers in the electricity sector because there is clearly
room for new entrants to undercut existing programs from monopoly
providers unaccustomed to competition. Already, unbundled REC
sales—sales that do not require the physical delivery of electricity
and thus bypass the natural monopoly—represent a majority of all

226. See supra Part I.B.1.
227. See Palmer & Burtraw, supra note 7, at 184 (“[S]ome view the move toward
greater consumer choice as a way to allow consumers to express demand for green power in
the market place.”).
228. See BARBARA C. FARHAR, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., WILLINGNESS TO PAY
FOR ELECTRICITY FROM RENEWABLE RESOURCES: A REVIEW OF UTILITY MARKET RESEARCH
2 (1999), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy99osti/26148.pdf (noting that without
being exposed to any special educational programs or materials, between 52% and 95% of
residential consumers were “willing to pay at least a modest amount more per month on
their electric bills for power from renewable sources”).
229. See PATASHNIK, supra note 30, at 156; see also Schraub, Sticky Slopes, supra note
9, at 1260 (noting that while normal mobilization and countermobilization stories focus on
“activat[ing] latent preferences,” social changes can also bring “completely new political
actors onto the battlefield”).
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green power sales in the United States.230 Many monopoly states
have “green pricing” programs where customers can purchase blocks
of RECs from the incumbent. NC GreenPower (used by monopoly
utilities in North Carolina), for example, offers RECs at a retail rate
of $4 per 100 kilowatt/hours (kWh), or $2.50 wholesale.231 Against
this figure, unbundled REC sales offer a very competitive alternative—the current market rate for RECs on the voluntary market is
less than $1 per megawatt/hour (or 10 cents per 100 kWh).232 And unlike retail competition itself, where friendly state commissions can
block outright the emergence of lower-cost competitors, state utility
commissions are sharply limited in their ability to limit voluntary
REC sales.233
Potential profits are likely just the tip of the iceberg, however.
More important from a retail restructuring perspective is the opportunity for new entrants to create a regular month-to-month relationship with consumers and access important consumer data invaluable
to power marketers.234 Monopoly status aside, incumbent utilities are
at an advantage over potential upstarts because they already possess
this intimate relationship with their consumers, a position which lets
them act as a “gatekeeper between the consumer and the electric
grid.”235 Even outside of a monopoly context, this sort of regular, relational interaction between company and consumer acts to reduce the
consumers’ effective choices by channeling their economic energies
into a loyal relationship with a single provider.236 Given the intimate

230. HEETER ET AL., supra note 136, at 7 (“Historically, REC markets have represented
the largest share of the voluntary market—larger than the volumes of green power sold
through utility programs or competitive retail suppliers. In 2010, 56% of all green power
sales occurred as REC only transactions that are separate from electricity sales.”) (footnote
omitted).
231. See, e.g., NC GreenPower, DOMINION, https://www.dom.com/residential/dominionnorth-carolina-power/ways-to-save/renewable-energy-programs/nc-greenpower (last visited
Apr. 4, 2015).
232. See HEETER ET AL., supra note 136, at 20.
233. See supra Part II.B.
234. In conversations with practitioners, regulators, and electricity industry
executives, all have emphasized the utility’s pre-existing, regular relationship with
consumers as a key advantage it possesses over competitors and also a key barrier that
non-incumbents face when seeking to gain significant retail electricity market shares.
235. Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jim Rossi, Good for You, Bad for Us: The Financial
Disincentive for Net Demand Reduction, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1527, 1544 (2012); see also
Angelina Liang, Note, Shedding Light: The Role of Public Utility Commissions in
Encouraging Adoption of Energy Efficient Lighting by Low-Income Households, 38 COLUM.
J. ENVTL. L. 333, 360 (2013) (noting this unique position of the utility offers opportunities
to educate consumers but also poses risks insofar as utilities are effectively the only
purveyors of information regarding electricity to consumers).
236. Jagdish N. Sheth & Atul Parvatiyar, Relationship Marketing in Consumer
Markets: Antecedents and Consequences, 23 J. ACAD. MARKETING SCI. 255, 256 (1995)
(defining “relational market behavior” as a consumers’ decision to engage in “purposeful
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relationship incumbents already enjoy with electricity consumers, it
has been historically difficult for potential competitors to build up
even a potential constituency that might contemplate switching. And
without a customer base willing to at least consider switching to a
different provider, retail restructuring is little more than a theoretical debate.
Emerging “smart meter” reforms—which aim to give consumers
real information about their electricity usage to help conserve energy
and reduce usage during high-demand, high-price times—have
opened up this relationship somewhat in recent years.237 For example, the “green button” initiative, pioneered in California and now
being promoted nationwide, seeks to provide consumers with “standard, routine, easy-to-understand access to their own energy usage
data” that can be (if the consumer desires) shared with third-parties
to assist them in managing their energy usage.238 For (legitimate)
privacy reasons, however, this information is not openly available—
consumers must voluntarily elect to disclose it.239
Offering voluntary RECs gives third parties the opportunity to
build a month-to-month electricity relationship similar to what the
utilities enjoy (albeit on a much smaller scale). Crafting this relationship opens the door to accessing the consumers’ smart-grid information. Put bluntly, offering voluntary RECs to retail consumers offers a credible way for electricity companies to convince those consumers to give them access to their electricity usage data on a monthto-month basis. This information is of essential import if potential

choice reduction” by entering into a loyal relationship with a single provider in lieu of
pursuing other competitive opportunities).
237. See, e.g., Sarah Darby, Smart Metering: What Potential for Householder
Engagement?, 38 BUILDING RES. & INFO. 442, 443 (2010) (exploring the ways in which
smart-metering expands the possibilities through which consumers can engage with their
energy usage); Joel B. Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism for the Smart Grid, 37
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 10 (2013) (“By 2015, 65 million American homes and businesses
may have smart meters that enable two-way communication between utilities and
customers.”).
Smart-metering need not be passive either—some forms allow consumers to “precommit” to only run high-energy appliances during off-peak times, thus saving money and
reducing grid stress during peak hours. See Stephanie M. Stern, Smart-Grid: Technology
and the Psychology of Environmental Behavior Change, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 139, 145-46
(2011) (noting that smart-grid technology “can also be utilized to allow consumers to ‘precommit’ to operating appliances or consuming higher levels of electricity during times
when energy demand and cost are lower”).
238. Aneesh Chopra, Green Button: Providing Consumers with Access to Their Energy
Data, ENERGY.GOV (Jan. 19, 2012, 2:54 PM), http://energy.gov/articles/green-buttonproviding-consumers-access-their-energy-data.
239. For a discussion on the privacy implications of smart-metering, see, for example,
Cheryl Dancey Balough, Privacy Implications of Smart Meters, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 161
(2011); John R. Forbush, Regulating the Use and Sharing of Energy Consumption Data:
Assessing California’s SB 1476 Smart Meter Privacy Statute, 75 ALB. L. REV. 341 (2012).
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retail competitors are to persuade anyone that they can offer electricity service at a lower price compared to the residents’ default
operator.
In addition, once the consumer base is in place, companies can
leverage their connections to the consumer to convert their interest
in RECs into an interest in retail choice generally. To be sure,
demonstration of a viable consumer base can have political impacts
even where that base cannot be successfully mobilized, because the
fact that the market exists is demonstrative of an economic (and thus
potentially political) constituency favoring greater reforms.240 This
dynamic helped promote support for RPS programs in many states
where successful penetration by the voluntary market demonstrated
sustained interest in and support for such renewable programs and
was integral in subsequent decisions to pass mandatory RPS.241
Similar mechanics could play out in the restructuring context:
From the beginning, the push for electricity restructuring has included a strong environmental component as advocates sought to give
consumers the ability to choose power providers that were greener
than the incumbent monopolies. Consumers electing to buy voluntary
RECs are likely to be consumers who would be amenable to buying
(bundled) green electricity, or at the very least consumers who have
demonstrated a willingness to be active participants in electricitypurchasing decisions. Voluntary REC purchasers present a new potentially salient energy constituency towards which policymakers
must be responsive, which in turn alters the political dynamic of energy policy debates.
That said, the voluntary REC market offers specific opportunities
for mobilizing consumers as potential constituents for retail electricity choice. The voluntary market is highly dependent on direct marketing, which creates opportunities for direct interaction between
company and consumer and allows them an effective avenue for promoting alternative energy supply arrangements.242 Marketing theorists have long asserted that such relationships between a company
and its consumers can create a cadre of customers “committed to
their market offerings.”243 Less explored is the prospect that these
240. See supra note 229 and accompanying text (noting that policymakers are
responsive to potential constituencies which may become “active” at a later date).
241. See Bird & Lokey, supra note 136, at 2-3, 18.
242. See id. at 18 (“Because of the emphasis on marketing, voluntary green power
programs can raise awareness and educate consumers about the benefits of renewable
energy in general . . . .”).
243. Sheth & Parvatiyar, supra note 236, at 264. For the theoretical underpinnings of
relationship research in the marketing context, see Susan Fournier, Consumers and Their
Brands: Developing Relationship Theory in Consumer Research, 24 J. CONSUMER RES. 343,
344-47 (1998).
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consumers may themselves be enlisted as political allies for altering
unattractive regulatory climates.244 While the American regulatory
structure acts “as if ‘business’ and ‘consumers’ were in a basically adversary relationship,”245 relational marketing suggests that consumers do not (or at least do not always) view the brands they engage
with in such hostile terms.246 Companies that gain the trust and loyalty of a cadre of consumers may be able to mobilize said consumers
as a second front in endeavors to lobby regulators and policymakers.
C. Partial Victories and Limited Competition
Even if it does not result in total deregulation of the retail electricity sector, voluntary REC sales can have more modest procompetitive effects. One potential candidate for reform is the possibility that vibrant, voluntary REC sales will increase support for mandatory RPS programs. While RPS programs have been implemented
in many states, there remain a significant number of holdouts.247 As
noted above,248 a vibrant voluntary REC market can increase political
support for mandatory RPS programs by demonstrating the existence
of popular demand for renewable power options.
Another area where partial pro-competitive advances may be realized is in the area of “net metering.” Net metering refers to arrangements where local consumers install renewable generation units
(most frequently solar) which feed additional renewable power into
the system, off-setting some or all of their own power usage.249 Advo244. Cf. Chenchen Huang et al., Timeshare Owners’ Perceptions and Preferred Ways of
Participating in Tourism Planning, 20 J. HOSPITALITY MARKETING & MGMT. 103, 104
(2011) (“For the timeshare industry, to mobilize their customers and get them involved in
tourism planning is an important channel to get the industry’s voice heard.”).
245. STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 6 (1982).
246. See, e.g., Neeli Bendapudi & Leonard L. Berry, Customers’ Motivations for
Maintaining Relationships with Service Providers, 73 J. RETAILING 15, 29 (1997) (noting
that in relationships where the consumer feels a sense of “dedication” (or affection) towards
a particular firm, they are more likely to engage in actively cooperative behavior alongside
the firm); Matthew Thomson et al., The Ties That Bind: Measuring the Strength of
Consumers’ Emotional Attachments to Brands, 15 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 77, 77-78 (2005)
(discussing the concept of emotional attachment as to brands and how it might motivate
persons to take actions which favor the brands’ interests even where they are not obviously
in the consumers’ own self-interest).
247. See, e.g., Gabe Maser, Note, It’s Electric, but FERC’s Cost–Causation BoogieWoogie Fails to Justify Socialized Costs for Renewable Transmission, 100 GEO. L.J. 1829,
1833 (2012) (noting Indiana’s decision to forego an RPS requirement and instead have only
a voluntary renewable energy target).
248. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
249. See Shannon Baker-Branstetter, Distributed Renewable Generation: The Trifecta
of Energy Solutions to Curb Carbon Emissions, Reduce Pollutants, and Empower
Ratepayers, 22 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 7-8 (2011) (discussing net metering policies whereby
consumer-generators receive cash payments for excess power they generate and feed into
the grid beyond their own usage).
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cates of net metering have explicitly characterized it as an effort to
“democratize the grid” and “take electricity services away from utilities.”250 Ironically, such distributed generation has encountered
heavy resistance in the southeastern United States, where abundant
sunlight has proven no match for incumbent monopolies jealously
protecting their exclusive right to sell power.251 But this might be
changing. In Florida, a hybrid liberal/conservative alliance has begun
pushing for new rules allowing rooftop-solar owners to sell their excess power directly to consumers.252 Framed as a direct challenge to
“excessive utility control over Florida’s energy generation,” the initiative combines liberal support for increased renewable energy options
with conservative preference for freer markets and more open
competition.253
Participants in the voluntary REC market have an opportunity for
synergy with net metering advocates on at least three dimensions.
First, where a consumer produces more renewable power than they
consume, net metering should create an additional source of REC
supplies that marketers can in turn resell to customers who either
are unable or unwilling to directly participate in distributed generation programs. Second, where a consumer generates less renewable
energy than their ultimate usage (that is, they are still partially dependent on dirty energy from the grid), the relative decrease in electricity usage may still redound to the benefit of REC sellers by increasing the margins on their REC sales.254 Finally, the entities
250. Melissa Powers, Small Is (Still) Beautiful: Designing U.S. Energy Policies to
Increase Localized Renewable Energy Generation, 30 WIS. INT’L L.J. 595, 657 (2012).
251. See Evan Halper, Rules Prevent Solar Panels in Many States with Abundant
Sunlight, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2014, 7:15 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/
la-na-no-solar-20140810-story.html#page=1. The Southeast is a region where regulatory
opposition to retail competition is particularly entrenched. See Pierce, supra note 105, at
484 (“In the Southeast, in particular, the ‘just say no’ utilities have been able to use the
formidable powers of their state PUCs as a shield to protect them from FERC’s efforts to
expose them to competition.”).
252. See Gavin Bade, GOP-Led Ballot Measure Seeks to Grow Rooftop Solar Market in
Florida, UTIL. DIVE (Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/gop-led-ballot-measureseeks-to-grow-rooftop-solar-market-in-florida/349598/.
253. Id.
254. This depends on the pricing model the REC seller uses. If they offer to cover a
consumer’s entire energy usage for a single flat rate, then the REC seller benefits when the
consumer uses less energy (and they have fewer RECs to compensate), while the consumer
benefits if they use more power (getting more green energy for each dollar spent). By
contrast, if the seller offers variable pricing, depending on the consumer’s actual electricity
usage, then the REC seller has an incentive for the consumer to use more power, because it
makes its money on the marginal cost of each credit sold, while consumers are incentivized
to use less.
This problem—electricity programs providing an incentive for over-consumption,
as opposed to energy efficiency—is of longstanding import in the power industry.
Traditional block rates allowed utilities to cover their fixed capital costs by lowering their
rates as more power was consumed (so long as the price paid by the average consumer
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which generate renewable power—and thus RECs—will also often be
best positioned to help install and maintain distributed generation
resources.
Recent research on the diffusion of rooftop-solar installation has
found a strong “neighbor” effect—persons are considerably more likely to obtain household solar installations where others around them
have done so as well.255 These cascade effects focus on the spatiality
of adapting new technologies or practices, but they also point to the
importance of social interactions between neighboring stakeholders
as a means of altering status quo behavior.256 People are more likely
to alter their behavior when presented with successful models of such
alterations from their peers. And people are more likely to support
changes to their settled practices if a proposed change is seen as an
outgrowth of familiar purchases, behaviors, or models. In either case,
local diffusion of the novel electricity product brings opportunities to
further leverage the gains.
Functionally, REC markets give new market entrants access to
customers in monopoly states and put them in a position where they
can more effectively advocate for their interests in state politics. That
does not guarantee that retail electricity restructuring will follow—
and perhaps that is how it should be. The risks and benefits of electricity competition are not uniform throughout all fifty states, and it
may be quite proper that each state retain the ability to decide for
itself whether and to what extent competition would benefit its citizens. This decision, however, should be made on the merits in a political climate where all relevant positions are aired and all affected
constituencies are heard. No longer boxed out of the political economy
of monopoly states, the inherently competitive nature of the REC
market and the corresponding foothold it can give new market entrants means advocates for competition can press their case on a level (or at least less lopsided) playing field.

approximated the average cost of the wattage). These distorted prices in favor of
overconsumption and modern pricing models have instead sought to increase the accuracy
of price signals by having consumers pay the marginal cost of producing the next kilowatt
of power. See Joseph P. Tomain, “Steel in the Ground”: Greening the Grid with the iUtility,
39 ENVTL. L. 931, 947-48 (2009).
255. See Marcello Graziano & Kenneth Gillingham, Spatial Patterns of Solar
Photovoltaic System Adoption: The Influence of Neighbors and the Built Environment, 15 J.
ECON. GEOGRAPHY (forthcoming 2015). Note that this Article specifically examined rooftop
solar diffusion in Connecticut, where the authors noted that political and regulatory bodies
have taken substantial affirmative steps to encourage distributed generation. It is unclear
whether these findings would replicate in more ambivalent political climates.
256. See generally William A. Brock & Steven N. Durlauf, Adoption Curves and Social
Interactions, 8 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 232 (2010) (identifying properties of adoption curves
that imply the presence of social interactions and their effect on the adoption of new
technologies).
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V. CONCLUSION
The voluntary REC market is unique in the electricity context: it
allows electricity generators and other market participants the ability to directly connect with electricity consumers. This removes an
important hurdle blocking the reinvigoration of electricity competition—neither incumbent providers nor unsympathetic state commissions can wholly box out potential competitors from any participation
in the retail electricity marketplace. Where restructuring proceeds
from there will likely continue to vary from one state to the next. But
even the partial incorporation of new players in the retail electricity
market holds the potential to reinvigorate the largely moribund
cause of electricity restructuring. As in the past, public demand for
additional green energy options may be the best opportunity for seeing a renewal of electricity competition.

